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ABSTRACT
The German unification and the collapse of Yugoslavia were major challenges to 
European stability in the first years of the post-Cold War era. The fall o f the 
ComiTiunist bloc towards the end of the 1980s turned upside down all the 
parameters in Europe which used to remain serene since the end of the Second 
World War. The German unification was almost a natural consequence of the fall 
o f Communism, since the division of the German state came into being after the 
Second World War, within the Allied powers’ aim to restructure the European 
balance of power. The unified Germany was regarded by its partners as a 
challenge to European politics, which might overrule the EC/EU, and which 
therefore needed to be contained in one way or the other. As the EC was busy with 
adapting to the changes brought about by the German unification, the Yugoslav 
war broke out and became a trial case in determining the new parameters of 
European, as well as German foreign policy aims.
fhe EU. in the new era, aimed to stand up in the international arena as a political 
actor on its own. This included the minimization of American influence on 
European politics. The US also expected the Europeans to solve their problems on 
their own. To this end. Yugoslavia again was the trial case, where the US held 
back for a long time and waited for the EU to take the initiative. However, time 
pro\ ed that the EU member states were so busy with trying to curtail each other’s 
influence that in the end they became unable to produce any policy and urgently 
required the US initiative for solution.
IV
ÖZET
Almanya'nın birleşmesi ve Yugoslavya’nın dağılması Soğuk Savaş sonrasının ilk 
yıllarında, Avrupa’nın süregelmiş istikrarını sarsan en belirgin olaylar olmuştur. 
Komünist Blok’un 1980lerin sonlarına doğru çökmesi, İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan 
bu yana dingin bir seyir arz eden Avrupa parametrelerini tümüyle sarsmıştır. 
Almanya'nın bölünmesi II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra, İttifak Devletleri tarafından 
Avrupa'nın güç dengesi için elzem görülmüş bir olgu idi ve II. Dünya Savaşı 
sonrası kurulan düzenin ortadan kalkması, doğal olarak Almanya’nın birleşmesini 
beraberinde getirdi. Birleşik Almanya’nın ekonomik ve siyasi potansiyeli ile 
AT/AB içindeki dengeleri etkilemesi kaçınılmazdı. Hatta böylesi bir Almanya’nın 
A f  içindeki muvazeneyi kendi lehine değiştireceği endişesini taşıyan Avrupa 
ülkeleri, 1990ların başından itibaren Almanya’yı dizginleme çabası içine düştüler. 
Tam bu sırada gelişmiş Avrupa’nın güney eteğinde, Yugoslavya’da savaş patlak 
verdi ve AT ülkelerinin kendi içindeki çekişmeleri ve yeni parametrelerin 
oturtulması için bir sınama alanı oluşturdu.
1990larla başlayan yeni dönemde AB, uluslararası ilişkilerde siyasi olarak daha 
aktil' bir rol alma çabası içindeydi. Bu, ABD’nin Avrupa’daki etkisini en aza 
indirgemek demekti. AB Yugoslavya’daki savaşı bu amaca yönelik bir ilk olarak 
değerlendirdi ve ABD’yi uzun bir müddet dışarıda tutarak kendi kıtasındaki bu 
sorunu kendi başına çözmeye çalıştı. Fakat zaman geçtikçe savaş çözümsüz bir hal 
aldı ve Avrupalılar henüz .Amerika’yı dışarıda tutarak siyasi \aptinm lar 
üretemediklerini fark etmek zorunda kaldılar.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War brought about dramatic changes to Western Europe 
whose system had been working for the maintenance of stability. Since 
Europe was at the center of the bipolar system that was established after the 
Second World War, it had also, after 1989, become the center of the 
revolutionary systemic level transition. As in all radical transitions, this 
upheaval came with pain and a heavy burden onto the shoulders o f the 
industrialized West Europeans. The unification of Germany and the 
dissolution of Tito’s Yugoslavia could be regarded as the most important 
part of this upheaval. The fall of the Soviet bloc and the German unification 
as a consequence was the sign of a new era in which the West European 
powers needed to reformulate the political balance of the Continent. While 
the EC (European Community) was trying to adjust itself to the 
consequences of the German unification, a war broke out in Yugoslavia that 
caught the EC napping. The EC, and the new Germany were expected to 
have considerable political weight in the international arena and the war in 
Yugoslavia turned out to become the trial case serving to this expectation. 
The ensuing wars leading to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, particulaily the 
one in Bosnia resulted in the death of thousands of civilians while the 
survivals either escaped or -thousands of women- were raped and 
humiliated. Due to their power struggle with one another, the West, for most
of the time during the war, appeared unable to formulate and implement 
deterrent policies.
The Germans had a special place within the West, since their reluctance was 
a very deep rooted one going back to their history. Their weight in world 
affairs had become undeniable after unification and they were expected to 
have more influence in international politics than ever before. However, 
coping with the past was not that easy for Germany and adjustment to the 
new role was not, therefore, forthcoming.
The topic under review here, namely, Germany and the Bosnian War; An 
Analytical Survey on the Formulation of German Foreign Policy from 
the Yugoslav Dissolution to the Dayton Accords, would require research 
and analysis at three levels: first, it requires a background analysis of 
German foreign policy traditions for a comprehensive understanding of 
Germany’s policy formulation; second, it necessitates a careful study on the 
dynamics of Yugoslavia which held the country together and caused the 
dissolution afterwards and finally, it urges for an analysis on the sources that 
determine the scope of the German-EC and German-US relations.
The dissertation is composed of six chapters, four o f which focus thoroughh’ 
on the events and the formulation of German policy; the other two consist of 
introduction and conclusion. Following the introductory first chapter, the 
second chapter attempts to give a historical background on German foreign 
policy formulation since 1949 with special reference to the circumstances 
that emerged after the Second World War. It describes the containment that 
Germany had faced during the Cold War and how this containment altered 
the German political culture. Upon the obstacles and opportunities cited in 
the first part, the second part of the chapter focuses on an analysis of 
German foreign policy formulation in the post-Cold War era.
The third chapter begins with a summary of the events that led to the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, together with the reactions to the dissolution 
from the outside world. An explanation is given, in the beginning of the 
chapter, on the factors that held the country together for almost four 
decades, together with a brief explanation as to how these cohesive factors 
brought about the end of Yugoslavia right after the death of Tito in 1980. 
The wars in Slovenia and Croatia are elucidated in the chapter as a 
consequence of the dissolution process. The last part of the chapter puts 
forth the EC attitude on the wars in Slovenia and Croatia and sets a deep
analysis on the factors leading to German recognition of Slovenia and 
Croatia earlier than its EC partners.
The forth chapter deals with the Bosnian War in the years 1992 and 1993 
and the failed peace initiatives of the West. The important remarks in this 
chapter are about Germany’s shift to passiveness in policy formulation due 
to the criticism it faced with the recognitions of Croatia and Slovenia and its 
sensitivity towards military contribution. The chapter sets out the judicial 
and psychological obstacles of the Germans in regard to military 
cooperation in Bosnia. The arguments of the German political elite, the view 
of the government and the opposition all are pieced together in this chapter.
The fifth chapter illustrates the involvement of the United States in 1994 and 
explains the road towards the settlement, leading to the Dayton Accord of 
November 1995. The chapter gives an ultimate analysis on the intra-Western 
struggle for prestige in respect to the war in Bosnia. A crucial part of the 
chapter examines the process leading to Germany’s decision to deplo\ 
troops in Bosnia, which may be regarded as a revolution in the history ol 
Germany’s foreign policy. The last chapter, conclusion, is a concise 
assessment of German foreign policy in the Yugoslav crisis, in general, and 
in the Bosnia War. in particular.
CHAPTER II
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1949
As the Second World War came to an end with the defeat of the German 
NAZI regime in 1945, the victorious Allied powers’ main objective had 
been decided on: to prevent Germany from threatening the European peace 
and security ever again. This objective became a cornerstone in the 
reformulation of the postwar political structure of Europe. The plan on this 
political structure was proposed to the three major powers by the European 
Advisory Commission (EAC)' in 1944. The proposal foresaw the division of 
Germany into zones of occupation between the Soviet Union, the US and 
Britain. This division into occupational zones was ratified by the heads of 
states of the three powers in Yalta in February 1945. Besides the three major 
powers, there were two more states that were allowed to take steak from the 
division. Poland was granted the territories between Oder and east of Neisse 
rivers for compensation. France formed a zone of occupation from the zones 
of occupation of the US and Britain, since it was the country that 
experienced the severest damage from the NAZI regime. Moreover the 
capital. Berlin, was also agreed to be ruled by a joint administration of the 
US. the USSR, Britain and France with a division into four sectors between 
these states. The aim of the division was to both share the responsibility, as
well as the authority in Germany. The intention, at least on the Western side, 
was to continue the wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union for the 
reconstruction of Europe and Germany.'
1 he division at the ‘heart’ of the continent was regarded as a necessity for 
permanent stability in Europe. Germany was a large and industrialized 
country, and leaving Germany isolated for punishment as in the post World 
War 1, would not be a solution. Because one of the factors leading to 
National Socialism in Germany was believed to be the feeling of isolation 
and humiliation that the German people developed after the defeat of 1918. 
Another political alternative that was debated for the treatment of Germany 
was neutrality. Especially Stalin was a staunch supporter of Germany's 
neutrality. However, the Western powers were aware that a country of 
Germany’s size and potential would not remain neutral. In addition, a 
neutral Germany would cause a power vacuum at the center of Europe. 
Moreover, the continual insistence by the USSR on neutrality created the 
suspicion that a ‘neutral’ Germany would sooner or later fall into the arms 
of Communism. So, the division of Germany into zones of occupation with 
the purpose of a joint administration appeared to be the only solution for 
Germany, as well as for Europe.
The I’otsdam Conference of August 1945 was the second decisive meeting 
between the US, Britain and the USSR. The significance of this conference 
was that it became clear between the Allied Powers that the wartime 
cooperation with the Soviet Union was an uneasy track to continue. Poland, 
whose annexation by NAZI Germany was the reason for entrance to war by 
Britain fell into a Communist dictatorship in the summer of 1945. The 
USSR was building a world based on its own ideological doctrine in the 
eastern part of Europe. Thus the new threat to European security was now 
the spread of Communism.
In response, the Western powers under the leadership of the US developed 
and implemented policies to contain the Soviet expansion to the West. The 
project of double containment, which was developed by the US, made up 
the core of this policy implementation. Washington’s objective through this 
project involved two points: one was to contain the Soviet Union and keep it 
at arm’s length; the second to restrain Germany through reconstruction and 
internationalization. Germany should become a democratic government, get 
economic self-sufficiency and be bound with multilateral, political and 
military treaties with the puipose of restrain.
“A central feature of Allied and especially American policies 
toward the Federal republic in the postwar era was the intention.
only superficially a paradox, to make the West Germans free and 
at the same time not free: free with respect to the personal 
liberties and constitutional safeguards that are the essence o f a 
democratic political order, but not free to formulate and 
implement an independent foreign policy.” ’
In the year 1949, two German governments came into being in the zones of 
occupation: in the western part the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 
and in the eastern part the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The world 
was based on an ideological division of power with the US on the one side 
and the USSR on the other. The central place to the bipolar world was 
Europe which was divided from its center, Germany. And Germany was 
divided from its capital, Berlin. This division brought up a unique concept 
known as the ‘German Question’ that dealt with the existence o f the two 
German states and the problems that emerged with these two states. The 
German question, was, indeed, an issue peculiar to the bipolar system and 
could not be overcome until the termination of this system.'^
2.1. Germany’s Foreign Policy During the Cold War
fhe constitution of the Federal German government voted in 1949 was 
SLireh not a sign for German absolute sovereignty. The status of 
occupational zones still existed de jure and continued to exist until 1955. 
However, even after 1955 and throughout the Cold War. Germany’s foreign
policies were vulnerable to the constrains and opportunities of the bipolar 
system more than any other country in Europe.
The parameters of the postwar Europe were always formulated by the US in 
cooperation with Britain and France. These were the containment of Soviet 
threat and Germany’s notorious past. The US aimed to build a military and 
economic cooperation in Europe against the Soviet threat. To make this 
policy work, West Germany should be fiilly integrated into this system.
“Given the continent’s serious economic and political problems, 
German issues were being gradually merged into a larger 
geographic and ideological context. With the Iron Curtain 
already drawn shut to the east, fears for the communization of 
Western Europe came to be mirrored in the fear of a Soviet 
takeover in Germany.”^
In the late 1940s and early 1950s all west European democracies, together 
with the Federal Republic, broke with their past and rejected protectionist, 
nationalistic economic policies in favor of an open market. For the Western 
European states realized that an efficient European cooperation could only 
be possible with the German economy integrated into the European 
economy. All the financial aid for the economic reconstruction of Europe 
came from the US, under the Marshall Plan of 1947. In April 1948, the 
OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) -known as
OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) after 
I960- was established with the signature of 16 European governments with 
the aim of implementing the Marshall Plan. In respect of this establishment, 
the Ruhr, which was composed of a high coal and steel industry, was to be 
under an international authority that would not involve the political 
separation of the region from Germtiny. The Plan also foresaw the 
establishment of a West German government; so Konrad Adenauer came to 
power as the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. 
and the Federal Republic of Germany was created under the auspices of the 
Western states. In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
was established for cooperation on the scarce and vitally important sources 
of coal and steel. The ECSC was a major step forward for reconciliation of 
Germany and France. It paved the way for a long process of economic 
integration and interdependence within the West European states. The same 
year, the Federal Republic also became a full member of the Council of 
Europe, and began to encourage unity and political cooperation among the 
European democracies.^
By the beginning of 1950s West Germany had made inroads in the way ol' 
respectability and the Allied control was liberalized. But there still existed a 
strong taboo on Germany on the issue of remilitarization, fhe Occupation
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Statute, which was signed by the high commissioners and Adenauer in 
November 1949. provided for the continued demilitarization in the country 
and forbade Germany from building up an army of any kind. The 
prohibition was so strict that even glider planes and fencing were not 
allowed under the heading of military exercise.^ In the meantime. The North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had been established in Washington 
in April 1949 between the West European powers and the US for the 
purpose of military cooperation and common defense. The year after, the 
NATO allies debated the issue of West German membership to the Atlantic 
Pact. The allies agreed that any policy leading to any kind of rearmament in 
Germany should not be allowed. So there did not exist any reason for 
German membership in NATO and the lifting of the ban on demilitarization. 
The reason, however, did urgently show up when in June 1950 South Korea 
was invaded by the Communist forces.
"NATO military planning antedated Korea, but the conflict 
brought home to the possibility of analogous Soviet moves in 
Europe. Everyone was uncomfortably aware that a divided 
Germany resembled a divided Korea, the major difference being 
that a war in Germany probably could not be contained.”*
Adenauer took the initiative of Korean War for regaining sovereignty for 
Germany. He offered the permission to form a federal police force against 
possible domestic subversions, as well as the establishment of an
11
international West European army, which would involve German 
contribution. By the end of 1954 the Atlantic Powers reached agreement on 
the German defense issue and came up with the so-called Spofford Plan. 
The plan foresaw the emergence of German military units under the control 
of NATO and a European Defense Community (EDC).’ The Occupation 
Statute was lifted up in 1955. A few days later Germany was granted full 
membership to the Atlantic Pact and became de jure an equal partner of the 
Western alliance.
Germany, historically, was a central state in European geography with its 
face more towards the East. With the alliances to NATO and the ECSC, it 
became for the first time in its history a country looking more to west, and 
formulating its national interests upon this new policy, which was named as 
the Westpolitik, and which altered the German political culture from its 
basis. Throughout the following decades, Germany was to identify itself so 
strongly with this policy that it became the most faithful advocate of the 
West European integration process. The significant point in this policy, 
however, was that Adenauer did not intent to break bonds with the east with 
Westpolitik; instead, he aimed to gain support and trust from the West for 
Germany’s basic aim, reunification.
12
During the first decades of the Cold War, the objective o f all German 
politicians -whether social democrat or conservative- was to reunite 
Germany. Their difference was the means they offered for this ultimate 
objective. The right wing Christian democrat Adenauer believed that 
German unification could only be possible through giving confidence to the 
Western allies and cultivating their willingness for the process. The left 
wing Social democrats, on the other hand, rejected this view and preferred to 
conduct more independent diplomatic initiatives with the East. This second 
trend came to power as soon as the Westpolitik was settled and determined 
German foreign policy for long decades. The fact that Germany had 
established a Western tradition in the Adenauer period balanced and 
softened this trend. The political initiative of the Social democrats placed 
emphasis on the undeniable historical and cultural ties to the East and 
attempted to improve the relations of the Federal Republic with its Eastern 
neighbors.
This improvement became known as the Ostpolitik and made up the second 
phase of German foreign policy during the Cold War. The first indications 
of the Ostpolitik came up in the early 1960s with the Chancellor Ludwig 
Erhard, the successor of Adenauer. Erhard mentioned to his Western allies 
the dilemma of Germany between east and west, and that Germany could
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not and should not ignore the East as long as its western alliance was not 
disturbed. I'he real name, which was to become identical with the term 
Ostpolitik, however, was Willy Brandt, the leader of the German Social 
Democrats of late 1960s and early 1970s, the Chancellor of the West 
Germany from 1969 to 1974.
"An essential ingredient of our Ostpolitik was that we applied 
ourselves to our own affairs in a new and more positive manner 
instead of relying solely on others to speak for us. This meant 
that, while remaining in touch with our allies and retaining their 
confidence, we became the advocate of our own interests vis-a- 
vis the governments of Eastern Europe. By so doing we 
strengthened our voice inside the bodies devoted to West 
European, Atlantic and international co-operation. The Federal 
Republic became more independent -  more adult, so to speak.” '“
The basic premise of Brandt's Ostpolitik was to improve social, political 
and economic ties with the East. Until the end of the 1960s, West Germany 
had declared itself as the sole representative of the German people, thereby 
rejecting the legitimacy of the GDR. So the first step came up in the form of 
recognition of GDR as a sovereign state. In the first half of the 1970s. West 
Germany concluded a series of treaties with the GDR. as well as the Soviet 
Union. Poland. Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. The 
Ostpolitik of Germany was not a policy implementation, independent from 
the Western allies of Germany, It is remarkable that the start of the 
Ostpolitik overlapped with the détente or, in other words, with the attempts
14
at normalization o f relationship between the East and the West. In Ma\ 
1972 the two major powers the US and the USSR concluded an agreement 
on the limitation of strategic arms."
fhe Ostpolitik continued also after the Brandt era within the constrains of 
the bipolar system. The policy began to bear some fruits in the mid-1970s 
with the emergence of new self-confidence within the country. The past 
decades had brought the conservatives and the social democrats more 
towards a consensus on the basic objectives of German foreign policy. The 
treaties with the East and the growing economy put Germany into a more 
equal status with its Western partners. The Federal Republic had become a 
mature state which no longer depended on the protectorate o f the US or the 
European partners.'"
On the other hand, the recession brought about by the oil crisis was a 
determinant of political preferences in the 1970s. Economic relations had a 
high priority during this period which, in turn, resulted in revitalization of 
the European Economic Cooperation, something that had been set aside in 
the 1960s. The Bonn government went on to improve its relations especially 
with France within the context of the European Community. France had 
distrusted Germany in the 1960s and claimed it to be a puppet of the US.
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However, the US influence and power in Europe began to decline in the 
1970s due to economic and political deficiencies. Paris and Bonn decided to 
cooperate for the sake of European security on their own and thereby, 
promote the European economic integration. The European powers also 
continued their economic relations with the East, especially with the Soviet 
Union, whereas the US, exercised economic sanctions on the Soviet Union 
due to the Polish events. This led to an internal struggle between the US and 
the European powers, where the European powers, as an exceptional case 
put pressure on the US and lifted the economic sanctions against the Soviet 
Union in 1982.
In 1983 elections, the Christian Democrats, after a long Social Democrat 
period, came to power and Helmut Kohl became the new chancellor. This 
did not lead to any dramatic changes in German foreign policy-making 
process, but there did occur very important political events. What Kohl did 
was to continue the Ostpolitik, as well as the West European economic 
integration process. Meanwhile, the change in the Soviet attitude on political 
and economic policies in the second half of the 1980s brought about a 
break-through in the East-West relations which resulted in 1989 in the fall 
of the Berlin Wall. The Berlin Wall, which was built in 1961, not only 
divided the two German states, but also symbolized the division of the two
16
opposing blocs. Therefore, when the Wall came down, it was obvious that 
more change was going to occur in the European geography.
Germany always felt constrained by the developments in its hinterland, 
since it is situated at the center of Europe. The bipolar system and the 
situation o f the two German states were interrelated, such that the existence 
of one depended on the existence o f the other. The fall o f the Wall was the 
first step o f a systemic level alteration in Europe. This was followed, a year 
later, with the reunification o f the two German states. A new era both for 
Germeiny and Europe was beginning.
2.2. The Unification and the Reformulation of German Foreign Policy
Just as the division in the 1940s, the reunification of Germany required the 
compromise and ratification of the states, which established the divided 
Germanies. At the end of January 1990, the US declared the necessity of 
German unification and called upon the interested parties for the regulations 
of the status of this new Germany. On 13 February 1990, the representatives 
of the four powers and the representatives of the two German governments 
met to discuss the issues concerning the German unification. These 
negotiations were named as the ‘Two plus Four’ negotiations, and dealt with
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the security and political status of unified Germany as well as with a clear- 
cut description of the frontiers of the new German state. The talks were 
concluded on 12 September 1990 and the four Powers agreed to leave off all 
their political authority, which they had possessed in the two Germanies 
until that date. Thus the German question, in one sense, was resolved and 
Germany four decades after it was divided regained full sovereignty as well 
as unity.'“'
But in some sense a German question was still present. The new German 
question was concerned with the place and political weight of the new 
Germany within a European and world context that was going through a 
historical change due to the fall of the Communist Bloc. Europe and the 
world was faced with a systemic-level revolution. Germany was at the 
center of this revolutionary change, since all its structure was based on the 
continuation of the Cold War period. Therefore, Germany's place within 
Europe needed to be redefined both by the outsiders as well as the Germans 
themselves. This included a reformulation of German foreign policy in 
regard to the new emerging constrains and opportunities.
The first determinant in German foreign policy in the new era would 
certainly be its relations with the other EU member states, especially its
relations with France. Throughout the Cold War the interdependency among 
the West European states had increased through the EC/EU process. 
French-German relations had made up the core of this integration process. 
Being the largest country of the Union, Germany did have significant 
inlluence within the EU. But this influence had been based on economic 
issues, since, politically, the country had had a long tradition of passiveness. 
The French-German cooperation, in fact, was that Germany had been 
tackling the economic issues, whereas France was leading the political 
issues of the Communit>. Germany had been defined as an economic giant, 
but a political dwarf, which actually pointed to the dilemma of German 
foreign policy. In the new era, the country still was and would be trying to 
overcome this dilemma and articulate its view on political issues. With the 
highest population and the strongest economy, Germany was expected to 
become more influential within the Community after the reunification. It 
was also expected to further its political weight -heavily, if not as heavy as 
its economic power- within the Community.'^
At this point relations w ith France was of prior significance. France, as well 
as the other members in the Community should not have any doubt that 
German\ would intend to overrule the EC. These doubts of the outside 
world were based on historical experiences and images o f a powerful
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Germany. One of the baste aims of the postwar period was to prevent a 
strong Germany. Now that a strong Germany had reemerged, old fears had 
eome up to surface. Right after the unification, scenarios on the emergence 
of a 'Fourth Reich' were made. Even by 1995, according to a public opinion 
poll, half of the French people recalled 'Hitler’ when they were asked on the 
characteristics of the German people.'* However, the Germans themselves 
were also very sensitive about the historical perceptions of their neighbors 
and would want to avoid the blame of such perceptions at any cost. This 
issue became a dilemma in Germany’s foreign policy reformulation: on the 
one side Germany would try to further its influence within the EC/EU, on 
the other it was constrained by its notorious past.
Indeed, there did not exist a chance for Germany to revive the past. Because 
during the four decades of the Cold Wtir, West Germany had become 
strongly integrated into the EC/EU and had started to define its national 
interests within the European context. The EC/EU process had become a 
source of identity for Germany more than any other EU member state. The 
Federal Republic seemed to be the most faithful advocate of the EC/EU 
process. When defining Germany's overweighing place within the new 
Europe, the German government on several occasions emphasized its wish 
ol'a 'European Germany' instead of a 'German Europe'.'
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With the fall of the Communist Bloc, Eastern European states had opened 
their gates to the liberal world and were expecting to become part of the 
West European integration process in one way or the other. As being at 
West Europe's frontier to the East, Germany was more concerned about the 
East European states than its Western allies. Instability in the East due to 
dramatic changes would firstly and directly affect Germany.
”We Germans have returned in 1990, within a more difficult 
world, to the Mittellage of Europe. A Mittellage means that one 
has several neighbors with convergent, often contradicting 
interests which it has to coordinate in order to claim itself to be 
cooperative within that circle.”'*
Germany's special care to its eastern neighbors is more than a consequence 
of geographical conjuncture. Germany had developed immense economic 
relations with the Eastern bloc countries during the Cold War. In addition, 
there are historical and cultural ties between Germany and its eastern 
neighbors. Moreover, stability in East Europe was of vital importance in the 
new era, because the East was the source of revolution in the European 
system, and things were altering at a dramatic speed. Ignorance about the 
region would import instability and uncertainty first to Germany and then 
affect all West European dem ocracies.S o  German interests in the region, 
in some sense, had been overlapping with those of the EU. Thus, Germany.
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al every opportunity, put strong emphasis on the East European countries' 
integration into the West, to which they were admiringly looking forward. 
The issue of East European states became an issue of Europe, and German\ 
managed to obtain priority in favor of the East European slates within the 
w idening process of the ED."''
One of the most vitally important actors in German foreign policy, 
throughout the Cold War was certainly the US. The US was the determininc 
factor in the reconciliation and normalization of Germany’s relations 
towards its European partners. From time to time German-US relations had 
been better than its relations within the Continent. With the unification, the 
outlook of German-US relations also needed reformulating. The attachment 
to the United States was based on security concerns, namely on NATO 
partnership. A new concept, “partner in leadership” emerged in regard to 
German-US relations in the new era.’’ In fact Germany did try to use the 
initiative brought forth by this new role. The first striking German 
contribution in accordance with this new role was felt in the NATO's 
formal Strategy Review and Force Reconstructing program of 1991. With 
the fall of the communist bloc, NATO required a redefinition of its 
objectives and German officials in this respect argued that the new risk for 
the West was instability and uncertainty of East European origin. So the task
should be cooperative peace building with the nations of the East as well as 
to continue alliance peace-keeping. By succeeding in its argument, Germanx 
-after its initiative within the EU- managed to obtain a prior position for the 
East European countries within NATO.
The other dimension of Germany’s security parameter was the European 
defense initiative, WEU. which was still going through a stage of maturity. 
It was based on a French proposal that aimed to minimize US military 
superiority in Europe and contain Germany within a continental defense 
system. Germany also strongly advocated the evolution of this European 
security identity within the European Union. In 1991 and 1992 the Bonn 
government sided with France for developing the WEU and CSCE 
(Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). Having NATO on the 
one side, and supporting the strength of a European defense community on 
the other, leads to another reality in German policy orientation; the 
indecisiveness between a US-led or a French-led European security."
In regard to foreign policy formulation, the social and psychological mood 
within the country should also be looked at in detail. Due to all the political 
e.xperiences of the past 40 years, the German people have developed a 
certain kind of political culture that basically, opposes power relying on
armed forces, is highly sensitive to humanitarian and ecological issues, and 
defends self-determination of nations at all costs.'' Since Germany itself has 
freshly experienced the reunification, it has a rather emotional perspective 
on any act that does seek independence. Actions which would be named as 
secessionism by other European powers can be perceived in Germany as 
natural aspiration to self-determination. Related to the military containment 
oi' the Cold War years as well as to the speculations made on Germany 
about its history, the Federal government showed great sensibility in the 
new era to avoid any military initiative by Germany outside the criteria 
described in the Cold War. Again due to the traditions of the Cold War 
decades, Germany’s and German people’s main focus has been on the 
economic issues both before and after the unification. Economic stability 
and well-being of the German people continued to be a focal point in 
German foreign policy in the new era. In fact most of German political 
initiatives try to serve the development of German economy in some means 
or the other. Moreover, the German government seemed very much 
\ ulnerablc to the demands of the public opinion in the new era. Therefore, 
they felt the need to give priority to the point of view of the German people.
fo sum up. German foreign policy parameters are determined by several 
internal and external d\namics. Germany’s economic strength is still the
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prior positive element at hand for Germany. Built upon this element the 
country tries to widen its politieal perspectives within its multilateral 
alliances."^ The EU is one of the main determinants of German foreign 
policy, though relations with the US remain vitally important. If these two. 
the EU and the US, do not see eye to eye during a particular crisis, it causes 
indecisiveness in German politics from time to time. In regard to military 
issues, the country seems to be extremely careful and refrains from doing 
anything that would give rise to misperceptions among its allies, because the 
Germans themselves, in their unconscious mind, still carry the feeling of 
guilt about their past. Therefore, the Federal Republic shows reluctance in 
widening the use of Bundeswehr parallel to the demands of the new period. 
Moreover, due to the geopolitical location, as well as the economic and 
cultural ties. Eastern European states do make up an important part of the 
German foreign policy formulation. In addition, the domestic political and 
social structure do have an inevitable impact on the government’s foreign 
policy decisions. As in any well-established democratic state, German 
governments feel the need to respond to the demands of the public in order 
to continue its existence. Thus the German foreign policy formulation 
during the dissolution of Yugoslavia requires an analysis upon the 
consideration of the domestic and international opportunities and constrains 
laid out.
CHAPTER HI
THE YUGOSLAV DISSOLUTION AND GERMAN ATTITUDE
3.1. A Brief History of Yugoslavia and Factors Leading to its 
Dissolution
Yugoslavia had been a created state of the twentieth century and its 
existence was a direct consequence of the circumstances and political 
developments in the Balkans after the two world wars. The first formation 
of a Yugoslavian state was a result of the post WWI Balkan settlements. The 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, together with the Bosnians and the 
Montenegrins, formed a common state in 1918 under the Karadjordjevic 
dynasty with a limited form of parliament. However, right from the 
beginning, there existed strong friction between the divergent cultures of 
Yugoslavia. Especially the Croats and the Serbs were not getting on well."
fhe first Yugoslav state was over with the invasion of Axis forces in the 
Second World War during which a civil war erupted in Yugoslavia where 
the racist Croat Ustashas took the support of Hitler, while both Serb and 
Croat Communists under Tito fought against the Ustashas. The Ustashas 
were allowed by Hitler to set up a greater 'Independent State of Croatia" in
the Balkans. The Serbs became one of the main victims of WWII. By 1945 
the Yugoslav nightmare was over and Tito, the Croat origin charismatic 
communist leader, managed to reunite and establish the Socialist Federal 
Yugoslav Republic.
As mentioned earlier, Tito’s Yugoslavia was composed of people from 
different ethnic and religious basis. Six republics, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia. 
Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina (hereafter Bosnia), Montenegro and two 
autonomous regions under Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija (hereafter 
Kosovo/a) and Vojvodina existed within Yugoslavia. Josip Broz Tito 
managed to hold together all these divergent republics and autonomous 
regions with the master of his unique communist dictatorship until his death 
in 1980. He established his own type of communist regime after Stalin 
expelled Yugoslavia from the Comintern in 1948. His anti-Soviet stance 
earned him credibility and support in the West. And with Western financial 
aid Yugoslav economy boomed from the 1950s to 1970s. Besides, Tito 
actively became one of the leading figures of the third way in international 
politics, the Non-Alignment Movement. All the success, however, was not 
only due to Tito’s intelligence, but also to the constrains and opportunities 
of the bipolar system. The multinational body of Yugoslavia was to start
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crumbling with Tito's death and eventually fell apart with the end of the 
bipolar system.'
Tito had always aimed to achieve a balance among the different nationalities 
of Yugoslavia. To this end, he enacted several constitutional amendments. 
The most important of these amendments was enacted in 1974, when the 
Bosnians, Macedonians and the Montenegrins were given political 
recognition as nations. Until 1974, the nation status had been granted only to 
the Slovenes, the Croats and the Serbs. In addition, there were two ethnic 
minorities that were given the status of nationality in 1974, namely, the 
Albanians of Kosovo/a and the Hungarians of Vojvodina. Vojvodina was 
composed of a Serb majority population, though with a significant 
Hungarian and a smaller Croat minority, whereas in Kosovo/a people were 
90 percent o f Albanian origin. With the 1974 amendment these two regions, 
which were initially part o f Serbia, gained an autonomous status just below 
that of a full republic with the ability to construct their own courts, police 
and territorial defense. They were also allowed direct participation in 
decision-making at the federal level, bypassing Serbia. Tito, through this 
process, aimed to keep Serbia, the largest republic of the country, under 
control. He appeared to have thought that otherwise Serbia would dominate
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Yugoslavia, destroying all the chances for a balance between all the 
republics.'^
After Tito, Yugoslavia was to be ruled by a kind of ‘term presidency'. 
However, as soon as Tito was gone, each republic began to put emphasis on 
its own national interests due to both economic and political problems. 
Towards the middle of 1980s, there was increasing uneasiness against 
Serbia in various parts of Yugoslavia, in particular, in Slovenia, Croatia, 
and Kosovo/a. At that stage, Yugoslavia was confronted with severe 
economic problems. Basic necessities of consumption were scarce and 
highly expensive. This led to individuality among the republics. Especially 
Slovenia and Croatia were better off economically and were not willing to 
take the burden of the whole country. Therefore, they were proposing a 
loose confederation for Yugoslavia with the retention o f only an economic 
union and cooperation in issues of foreign policy and defense.“'^
In Serbia, on the other hand, nationalism was on the rise. The Serbian 
Academy of Arts and Sciences issued a Memorandum in 1986, which 
claimed that the amendments of 1974 constitution were unfair, and which 
demanded the termination of irredentist and separatist movements of the 
Kosovo/a Albanians. It also demanded that the continual anti-Serb
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propaganda all over Yugoslavia should be stopped. The Memorandum 
maintained that the Serbs in Croatia had always been discriminated against 
and even subjected to genocide. This was a modernized version of the dream 
of Greater Serbia. This Greater Serbia included Bosnia, the bulk of Croatia. 
Montenegro and Macedonia. The definition o f the frontiers was not only due 
to historical arguments, but also due to present economic conditions. Croatia 
was rich of oil and gas, and also hosted most of the money spinning tourist 
industry in Yugoslavia. Bosnia had some natural resources, but more 
significantly, much of Yugoslavia’s arms industry was located on its
territory. .■¡0
Built upon this ideology, in 1987 Slobodan Milosevic got the upper hand in 
the fight over leadership for Serbian Communist Party. In his first visit to 
K.osovo/a, having taken up his new job, he made a point of speaking on 
behalf of both the Serbian and Montenegrin minorities there which in turn 
earned him extensive popularity within Serbia and Montenegro. In Januai) 
1989, he extended his control over Montenegro by means of a political 
coup. In March 1989, Serbia, unilaterally lifted the autonomous status of 
Kosovo/a and Vojvodina. Student upheavals and demonstrations took place 
in Kosovo/a upon this action. But the federal army which was under hea\ \ 
control of Serbia crashed the demonstrations bv force. Slovenia and Croatia
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protested the act by pulling back their forces from the federal army. When 
Milosevic appeared adamant, the Slovenes and Croats then stopped paying 
taxes to the federal government, claiming that it was used for Serbian 
national interests.’'
In March and April 1990, the first multiparty elections of the past fifty years 
were held in Slovenia and Croatia respectively; in both, the parties favoring 
national sovereignty and proposing looser confederation for Yugoslavia won 
the elections. The same year, the Bosnian elections, brought to power also a 
non-communist government. The end of 1990 added Macedonia to this 
change where the communists only formed the little partner in the coalition 
government. Only in Serbia and Montenegro did the communists held on to 
power. Thus the disagreements among the republics deepened due to the 
differences of political preferences where especially the non-communist 
governments of Slovenia and Croatia wanted to weaken the centralization, 
but the communist government of Serbian republic insisted firmly on more 
centralization.’"
On 23 December 1990. Slovenia held a plebiscite in which almost ninel> 
percent of the Slovenian citizens authorized the Slovenian parliament to 
declare independence if in six months no positive conclusion could be
reached for a new constitution of a looser confederation. The last straw for 
the Slovenes and Croats emerged when the Serbs and Montenegrins blocked 
the confirmation of the Croat Stipe Mesic as chainnan of the Federal 
presidency. This action led to Croatian and Slovenian declaration of 
independence without actually seceding from Yugoslavia, in order to give it 
a last chance for compromise. In the first days of January 1991, the 
representatives of Slovene and Croat governments met and declared that 
they would, starting with 28 December 1990, not be obliged with federal 
duties and nor for the federal foreign debts.^^ Further negotiations continued 
between Serbia on the one hand, and Slovenia and Croatia on the other in 
the first half of 1991, which produced no agreement. Slovenia proclaimed its 
independence and took control of its borders on 23 June 1991 and Croatia 
on 24 June.
3.2. The Wars in Slovenia and Croatia
fhe proclamation of independence gave the Federal Army of Yugoslavia 
(JNA), the excuse to attack Slovenia. This was the first step of the horrible, 
bloody war of Yugoslavia which would go on with an accelerating terror in 
the following four years.
When, on 25 .fune 1991, the Serbianized JNA attacked Slovenia, the 
Western public was shocked while Western governments were trying to 
decide whether the issue was a domestic problem of Yugoslavia or an 
aggression of one state on the other. The Serbs dreamed to conclude their 
work before the West decided on the subject. However, the Slovenians put 
up a well-organized resistance and the JNA soon ran out of steam. The 
Slovenian resistance resulted in an unexpected defeat for the Serbs.
As the war in Slovenia was in full-swing, President Tudjman of Croatia sat 
back and watched the developments, although he had earlier promised the 
Slovenian President Kucan support and cooperation in December 1990. 
Moreover he let the Federal army pass through Croatian territory to attack 
Slovenia. By this way Tudjman thought to have secured his country; 
however, this policy nearly led to the destruction of Croatia.^'’
By mid July the Serbian and the Federal Army leaders had been defeated 
and, therefore, they decided to let Slovenia go. Therewith they turned their 
face to Croatia, which, they concluded, was much more important for 
'Greater Serbia'. Indeed, the situation in Croatia was more suitable for the 
Federal Army with the 11 percent Serb minority already armed and 
organized secretly for a possible attack. The Croats were mostly unprepared
for such an eventuality, since they thought that their cooperation with the 
Serbs in the war in Slovenia would save them. All this proved 
miscalculation.'^
Thus a full-blown war began in Croatia between the well-armed Serbs and 
the unprepared Croatian defense forces soon after the war in Slovenia ended. 
The Federal Army intervened under the pretext of separating the warring 
sides and by so doing gave extensive support to the local Serb forces. In 
September 1991, the Serbs captured the Krajina region and embarked on a 
large-scale ethnie cleansing campaign; Croats were either killed or forced 
out of the region. The JNA targeted Croatia’s most famous tourist resorts, 
including Dubrovnik, and slaughtered thousands o f Croats.^'’
3.3. Germany’s Attitude at the Onset of the War within its European 
Constrains
As late as 20 .lune 1991 of the CSCE conference in Berlin, the German 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher declared that Germany was keen 
to preserve Yugoslavia as a single entity. This, indeed, reflected the overall 
European view. Since the fall of the Communist bloc, Europe was going 
through dramatic changes. The changes brought about a certain amount of
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unpredictability which, in turn, could endanger the ongoing European 
stability that the Western powers had managed to maintain in the previous 
four decades. Therefore the Europeans adopted a policy that favored the 
preservation of Yugoslavia at all costs and forestall instability in Europe. 
Yugoslavia, according to the Europeans, resembled the Soviet Union and a 
Yugoslav dissolution could have negative impacts on the unity of the Soviet 
Union, which the Europeans and the US were in favor of holding together 
with Gorbachev at its head.
"Yugoslavia’s troubles became visible at a time when the West 
was bewildered by the collapse of Communism and the break-up 
of the Soviet empire, which had reined in the turbulent peoples 
of Eastern Europe. ...the European Community, as it turned into 
the European Union, was in the middle of a public argument 
about where it was going. The Yugoslav Crisis threatened to 
destabilize the continent when Europe as a whole was trying to 
adjust to the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War. 
The EU, seeking a united international role, was forced into the 
Yugoslav mess, first as mediator, then as arbiter. It had prestige 
and influence, but it was not a security organization, and it had 
certainly not been put together to deal with civil wars outside its 
territory. The Twelve talked about a common foreign policy. 
They hoped to acquire one in handling the breakup of 
Yugoslavia... some feared the consequences that the breakup of 
Yugoslavia could have in the Soviet Union, or even at home. 
Others rushed in to stake their share of influence...
A week later, as the EC prime ministers and foreign ministers met in 
Lu.xembourg. the .fNlA forces had entered Slovenia and war started. In 
response, the Community dispatched the Troika', the past , present and the
coming foreign ministers of the Presidency of the European Council of 
Ministers, for a mission of mediation to Yugoslavia. In June troika was 
composed of Gianni de Michelis (Italy), Jacques Poos (Luxembourg) and 
Hans van den Broek (Netherlands). Its aim was to establish a cease-fire in 
Yugoslavia, which came up on 7 July with the Brioni agreement that 
foresaw the ,INA troops leaving Slovenia in the following three months. The 
EC would monitor the events with a semi-military organization, the 
European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), which would then 
operate within the framework of the CSCE. The agreement also pointed to a 
looser confederation for Yugoslavia The Europeans regarded this as a 
triumph of their diplomacy in stopping the war; where, in fact, the fighting 
had stopped, as will be seen below, due to the Serbs exhaustion and the 
successful resistance the Slovenes had put up against it.'''
In the meantime, the already existing public pressure in Germany was 
increasing with the aim of pushing the Federal government to take the 
initiative to stop the war. The public argued that recognizing Slovenia and 
Croatia would put an end to the fighting and eventually finish all the 
ongoing bloodshed. Based upon this view, the German Chancellor, as earl\ 
as 2 July, assured the German public that he would press for the principle of 
self-determination which Germany itself had always sought. Germanx
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declared its view in the EC foreign ministers summit on 5 July, but was 
highly criticized and isolated. The German proposal was seen in direct 
opposition to the Community's spirit of cooperation. The Franco-British-led 
view that Yugoslavia should be held together at any cost dominated the 
conference. The EC appointed Lord Carrington to operate the negotiations 
of the European plan. During the same period, the UN appointed Cyrus 
Vance as the special envoy for the negotiations of Yugoslavia. ’’
The war in Croatia continued throughout July and August with Europe 
unable to impose any cease-fire. Although the EC monitors were appointed 
for Croatia under Brioni, they could not enter Croatia until the cease-fire on 
2 September. A day after the cease fire, it was announced that the EC 
conference on Yugoslav peace and reconciliation would be held in the 
Hague on 7 September under the leadership of Lord Carrington. ‘The talks 
would be on the basis of three principles: no unilateral changes of borders, 
protection of rights for all minorities, and full respect for all legitimate 
interests and aspirations.’’“ While Carrington stated cease-fire as a 
precondition to start negotiations, right after the beginning of the 
Conference he had to forget about his previous statement since fighting 
restarted in Croatia. After the opening session of the Conference. Camngton 
began a series of private meetings with all the Yugoslav leaders and foreign
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ministers in an attempt to mediate. Several temporary cease-fires were 
concluded during his negotiations, mainly due to the parties' need of pause 
instead of a will for a permanent compromise.'" September ended with the 
imposition of a UN arms embargo against all the Yugoslav territories.
At the beginning of October, the fighting intensified as the 90-day 
moratorium on the Slovenian and Croatian declarations approached towards 
its end. Tudjman ordered full mobilization of its army and the JNA 
responded with renewed attack across Croatia, including bombardment of 
the historic port of Dubrovnik. On 6 October the EC, on the basis of the 
reports from ECMM, identified JNA as the chief offender, whereas the 
German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher had declared the Serbs as 
the main aggressor in the conflict as early as August. Genscher had also 
proposed the imposition of economic sanctions on Serbia the same month 
which only could come into being in November, and that -despite the 
German opposition- on all parties. It was only after the fall of Vukovar in 
December that the sanctions, upon the German pressure, was limited to 
Serbia and Montenegro.^" By October Germany had increased its pressure 
for recognition within the EC framework and was threatening to act 
Linilateralh outside it. Upon tremendous German pressure, Carrington 
proposed a Draft Convention which agreed that those republics seeking
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independence would gain it under certain conditions including provisions 
for minorities and the maintenance of a single economic space through a 
customs union. The plan was accepted by all the republics of Yugoslavia, 
except Serbia. Thus Carrington’s plan came to no avail. By mid-November 
the Community appeared to be passing the first hand in the negotiations to 
the UN envoy Cyrus Vance.
Towards the end of 1991. the dissolution process of the Soviet Union, which 
the Europeans had tried to avoid looked imminent. That meant that one ol' 
the major arguments of the EC for insisting to hold Yugoslavia together was 
eventually disappearing. In the meantime, the Maastricht process had been 
finalized and a new era had begun in the EC (hereon EU). Whereas the EC 
foresaw cooperation and unification on economic issues, the European 
Union (EU) process beginning with Maastricht deepened the 
interdependence between the West Europeans. In this new era, the EU 
would begin acting as a single entity on political and security issues which, 
in turn, was expected to challenge the international politics. Under these 
altered circumstances, Germany intensified its argument on the recognition 
of independence of the Yugoslav republics. After long debates on the 
structure and time of the issue, the recognition was accepted in December 
1991 by the EU in principle. A special commission was established for the
purpose of assessing which republics met the requirements set by the Union. 
The Commission was headed by the French Constitutional Expert Robert 
Badinter and searched for the existence of respect for territorial integrity, 
minority rights and establishment of democratic institutions. Two republics, 
Slovenia and Macedonia stood out, meeting the required conditions. Croatia, 
on the other hand, needed to improve the conditions for its minorities. The 
Croat government promised to take necessary measures as soon as possible. 
Following the report of the Commission, on 17 December 1991, the EU 
decided to grant Slovenia and Croatia recognition. Macedonia, on the other 
hand, although meeting all requirements, could not gain recognition due to 
the arbitrary veto of Greece.
“Thus, it was agreed that recognition of the two Balkan states 
should not occur before January 15, 1992, and that to give the 
EC strategic volte-face a modicum of orderliness, a five-member 
EC judicial commission would be established to assess 
applications from those Yugoslav republics seeking 
independence and diplomatic recognition.’”'^
Though the EU had stated that it would put the recognitions into practice in 
1992; Germany, as Chancellor Kohl promised, declared its recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia ‘before Christmas of 1991’. Germany’s rush that was 
highly criticized outside, had impacts both on domestic and international 
politics. '^ '^
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3.4. Causes and Impacts of the German Push for Recognitions
Germany’s ‘earlier’ recognitions of Slovenia and Croatia seemed to be an 
extraordinary case for German foreign policy traditions. However, there 
were several domestic and international elements that led to Germany’s rush 
for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
First of all, Germany was the EC member state that was touched directly by 
the drawbacks of the war in Yugoslavia due to its geographical position. 
From the beginning of the second half of 1991 onwards, thousands of 
refugees from the former Yugoslav territories -  according to statistics by the 
end of 1992 - some 200.000 fled to Germany.'*^ The Yugoslavians were 
initially the second largest group of Gastarbeiters in Germany. When the 
war erupted 500.000 Gastarbeiter of Slovene and Croat origin were already 
residents in Germany. But this number increased with refugees that put a 
heavy economic as well as social burden on the country. Having left no 
other topic at hand in the last forty years, economic prosperity and social 
well-being had become the utmost important one in German society. In
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1991 the country had just overcome the economic burdens of the 
unification, and the German people were hoping to go back to their 
prosperous and peaceful life. The problem of refugees was however, a 
surprise issue not of a pleasant type.
In addition, the German public opinion and the media had developed a high 
sensitivity on humanitarian issues, again somehow related to German non 
armament during the Cold War and Germany’s notorious past that they have 
always wanted to cover in their own consciousness. The Germans could not 
stand to watch the blood and brutality of a war every night on their 
televisions. The places shown on television screens as being destroyed b> 
the Serbs were familiar to the German people as their holiday places. This 
familiarity also made them more sensitive on the issue.''*
The public opinion’s pressure to take an initiative to stop the war was 
increasing in such a manner that the politicians could not ignore it. It was an 
exceptional topic upon which both the Social Democrats and the Christian 
Democrats expressed full agreement. Therefore, would not be politically a 
sound decision to ignore an issue that galvanized the public. The Liberal 
Democrat Foreign Minister. Hans-Dietrich Genscher was becoming 
increasingly worried about the coming closer of the two opposing major
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political parties of the country, since the existence o f the Liberal Democratic 
Party was secured on the dispute between the Social Democrats and the 
Christian Democrats, which, in turn gave the opportunity to the Liberal 
Democrats to be a partner of all the governments that came to power since 
the end of the 1960s. Genscher obviously felt the need to implement a 
policy which, he thought, would put an end to the war in Yugoslavia. The 
recognitions were intended to stop the bloodshed in the Balkans without 
taking into consideration the Serb ambiguity of a ‘Greater Serbia’.
“Genscher came under sudden and unexpected domestic 
pressure to revise the existing policy on Yugoslavia, not because 
Germany had any geopolitical interest in the Balkans but 
because the German political parties agreed that the violence in 
Yugoslavia threatened European stability, and that the main 
culprit was Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Serb- 
dominated Yugoslav People’s Army.”'*’
The Germans were also so sensitive about the issue because their personal 
experiences differed from that of the other EC member states. The freshly 
united Germany was more of an advocate for nations’ right to self- 
determination than its European allies, which were faced with challenges to 
their own soil; the British have had a deep-rooted conflict with the Irish 
secessionist move, IRA; Italy had barely resolved the South Tyrol question 
with its German-speaking minority and was beset by the revolt of the 
Northern Leagues against the corruption of the centralized state. The French
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government, on the other hand, faced endemic terrorism by Corsican 
nationalists. It was thus hardly surprising that the French Foreign Minister. 
Roland Dumas, felt the need to declare ‘It is not the role of the EC to 
promote the independence of peoples.
The German attitude did have a loud impact on the international arena. It 
was looked upon suspiciously and regarded -by some- as the revival of 
German nationalism of the 1930s. Bonn was even accused of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, which, in fact by then, had already become an 
inevitable conclusion. However, somebody should be singled out for the 
guilt of the continuation of the war; and Germany was selected. The Serbs 
seized upon it, claiming that the historical Germanic-Catholic alliance was 
reestablishing itself to discriminate the Serbs; the ‘Fourth Reich’ came into 
being and was willing to annex southeast Europe again. The fact that the 
Italians and the Hungarians were the first states to follow the German 
initiative had given the Serbs further ammunition for their propaganda 
machine.
The German initiative also received criticism from its EU partners. Lord 
Carrington, for instance, blamed Kohl and Genscher to have flamed the war 
in Yugoslavia. Kohl and Genscher were accused of betraying their European
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partners. The German recognition, overall, nullified the relevance of the 
Badinter plan, through which the EU aimed to impose its criteria for 
recognition on Croatia, which lacked the institutional arrangements for 
minority rights, and which had accepted a constitutional improvement o f 
those before gaining recognition. Now that recognition was gained without 
the fulfillment of the preconditions, Croatia would be less eager to improve 
the conditions for its minorities. In order to overcome this blame Genscher 
pushed the Croatian government to revise its constitution, meeting the 
Badinter objections. The Croat government proposed, upon this pressure, a 
constitutional amendment which was adopted by the Peirliament five months 
later, in May 1992. The legitimacy of the amendment, however, was little, 
since it was a result o f face saving for Germany. The matter concerned the 
public debate and the compromise and negotiation of the government and 
the minority communities. But this was not the case, thus Genscher’s 
initiative came to no avail. The incident was likely to encourage other 
republics seeking recognition and lacking the same preconditions.^”
Moreover, Germany was also accused of having ignored the guilt o f Croatia 
in the war and directed all the evil only on Serbia. The reason for this 
German attitude was apparently a reaction to the pro-Serb stand in the other 
major capitals of Europe, namely Paris and London. According to one
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argument, the British and French reluctance to define the Serbs as the major 
aggressor of war forced Germany to take an anti-Serb stance.^' According to 
another, the British and French stance was a reaction to Germany. Britain 
and France did have fears on the future role of a united Germany.
■’Historical memory in Western Europe is not as insignificant as 
many Euro politicians pretend, and a united Germany did 
change the political landscape of Europe. Moreover the cost of 
uniting Germany has created a number of difficulties for 
Western European economies. So I think that the problem of 
Germany was then transferred to the Balkan situation, and in a 
curious way. European actions or decisions were less a response 
to the question of what path to find for the successor states of 
Yugoslavia and more a part of political fencing that went on 
between the Germans and their Western allies. Perhaps these 
divisions would have come over other issues, but they came 
precisely over the issue of Yugoslavia, and demonstrated amply, 
in 1991-92 -the year of European tmity- the extent to which 
Europe was not really united and not really a political entity.”'’"
Despite all. Chancellor Kohl presented the recognitions as a victory of 
German diplomacy at home. In reality, the Kohl - Genscher initiative was a 
signal of the limits to which the EU diplomacy could formulate a common 
foreign policy. The policy pointed to the dilemma of German diplomatic 
preferences squeezed in between its responsibility within the EU and its will 
to become more active on behalf of its increased weight. The issue of 
■premature’ recognitions fiamed the debates on Germany’s political weight 
within the European and world political context. Germany was expected to
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take a more active role in the international politics, but this role should not 
become an overruling influence on Europe. The same dilemma was also 
present within the country as well; the government was trying to show a 
political power close, if not equivalent, to its economic weight, at the same 
time intending to avoid any misperceptions which its allies might develop 
on the German image. Thus the relatively passive German foreign policy on 
the Yugoslavian dissolution at the begining of 1992, can be better examined 
under these contradictory preconditions.^^
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CHAPTER IV
THE WAR IN BOSNIA IN 1992-1993 AND GERMAN DIPLOMACY
4.1. Beginning of the War in Bosnia 1992
Bosnia was the province that lay in the south-west of the former Yugoslav 
territories.’  ^ Among other tribes the Slavs entered the region in the seventh 
century and were named after the territory, Bosnians.”  Until 1180 pov\ er 
changed hand in Bosnia between the Byzantine Empire, the Croat and the 
Serb Kingdoms. From 1180 onwards the authority began to settle down and 
Bosnia became an independent kingdom with its own Catholic Church. The 
Ottoman conquer of the kingdom of Bosnia came in 1463. Beginning with 
the following century, most of the Bosnian population converted voluntarily 
to Islam in big numbers, such that the ratio changed in favor o f the Muslims.
After remaining under Ottoman rule for four centuries, Bosnia passed to the 
.Austro-Hungarian rule in 1878 due to the weakening of the Ottoman 
authority. Meanwhile, by .lune 1914 Serb nationalism had flourished and 
became a source of friction in the Balkans. This friction flared up with the 
assassination of the heir to the Habsburg throne by a Serb nationalist in 
Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. In the Inter-War period the first Yugoslav state
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was established and the Bosnians came under Yugoslavia. Finally beginning 
with 1945 until the 1980s, the Bosniaks lived under Tito's Yugoslavia.
Bosnia was by area the third largest republic of Tito’s Yugoslavia, after 
Serbia and Croatia. Almost half of its population was Moslem/Bosniak, a 
third of Serb origin, 17 % Croats and 8% others with people identifying 
themselves as only ‘Yugoslav’. The country resembled a microcosm of 
Yugoslavia with its pluralistic cultural outlook.^’ The difference from the 
general structure of Yugoslavia was that the people in Bosnia were not held 
together by any dictated authority. They have lived in harmony for 
centuries; until the emergence of ultra-nationalistic Serb ambitions.
Bosnia, initially, did not want to separate from Yugoslavia. It kept silent 
throughout the whole process that led to Slovenian and Croatian 
declarations of independence. However, as soon as the two republics gained 
recognition, Bosnia suddenly realized that it was left in a smaller 
Yugoslavia to be dominated by a big Serbia. Under the newly established 
circumstances, remaining within Yugoslavia seemed impossible. Thus on 29 
February and 1 March 1992 the Bosnian government held a referendum on 
independence as a precondition for diplomatic recognition. I he referendum 
was boycotted by Bosnia’s Serbs under the leadership ot Radovan Karadzic.
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More than seventy percent of the voters participated, and 99 percent of them 
voted in favor of independence and Bosnia was recognized as a sovereign 
state by the EU on 6 April 1992 and the US followed suit. The country 
became a member of the UN together with Slovenia and Croatia on 22 May 
of the same year.’*
It seems that to achieve the aim of a ‘Greater Serbia’, the Serbs had drawn a 
military strategy in autumn 1991 which was to be carried out jointly by the 
JNA forces and the local Serb paramilitaries. By winter 1991-1992, the 
Serbs had set up artillery positions around major cities, including the capital, 
Sarajevo. These forces were backed up by additional JNA units which were 
being transformed into Bosnia from Croatia where cease-fire had been 
achieved in early 1992. All of these preparations culminated in the 
proclamation of a Bosnian Serb republic on 27 March 1992. On 30 March 
following a series of incidents in various Bosnian cities . the JNA’s ehief 
declared that his troops were ready to ‘protect’ the Serbs of Bosnia. This 
was the beginning of a terrible slaughter which would shock the world 
public.
I'hroughout the following month, large-scale massacres were carried out by 
the Serb paramilitary forces in close cooperation with the .INA in eastern
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Bosnia. At this stage, the Croats in the south and north fought successfully 
in alliance with the Bosniaks. But this alliance was to be broken up soon 
when the Croatian President Tudjman set about taking large part of Bosnia 
for the Croats. From the end of summer 1992 onwards, the Croats under the 
leadership of Mate Boban and the supervision of Tudjman began ‘cleansing' 
some areas in southern Bosnia from their former allies, Bosniaks. According 
to the Serb-Croat deal in 1992, Serbia would concede Croatian sovereignty 
in the Krajina region, while the Croats would let Eastern Slavonia go to 
Serbia. So the Serbs and Croats would share Bosnian territory.
When fighting broke out in Bosnia in April 1992, the Belgrade authority 
repeatedly stated that the JNA was only acting as a ‘peace-keeping’ force. 
But in reality, it was conducting a war of aggression against a neighboring 
state which had received worldwide diplomatic recognition. On 27 April, 
Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the new State of Yugoslavia. In May, an 
announcement was made that the JNA soldiers of Bosnian Serb origin 
would be transferred with their weapons to the new Serb republic in Bosnia, 
while the rest would withdraw from the country. General Ratko Mladic, 
commander of the .INA in Knin during the war in Croatia in 1991, was 
appointed as the head of the Bosnian Serb army. In this way Milosex ic 
aimed to give the impression to the outside world that he had nothing to do
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with Bosnia, and that all was a conflict between the local Serbs and the 
Bosniaks. But this was certainly not the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, 
he achieved his aim and served as a saver for the Western politicians who 
were searching for an escape from military intervention. Now, they could 
name the aggression a 'civil war’ and have their conscious free.^'
4.2.Attitude of Germany and the International Community in the 
Bosnian War (1992)
The German deed of December 1991 caused immense criticism and 
Germany stepped back from its ‘active’ role in the Yugoslav crisis 
thereafter. In fact, the criticism put Germany into the position of a scapegoat 
since the war did not come to a permanent end. First and foremost, Germany 
showed much more reluctance and ignorance to the nations' right to self 
determination after December 1991. By this attitude, it, in some sense, 
approved the claims that the recognition of Croatia was more of a matter of 
social and historical ties than a matter of pure faith in the nations’ right to 
self determination.'’”
In May 1992, the foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who managed to 
hold the chairmanship of the Liberal Democrats for some twenty years, was
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replaced by Klaus Kinkel who then became the Foreign Minister. Klaus 
Kinkel. at the first opportunity, declared that Germany would strictly be 
bound to its allies, and that there would never again be a German unilateral 
diplomatic initiative.'^' Therefore beginning with 1992, “Bonn committed 
itself fully to supporting international initiatives, whether with other 
countries, such as the US and France, or through international bodies like 
the UN, the EU. ICFY and significantly in terms of Germany’s diplomatic 
evolution, the Contact Group.” "^ German foreign policy priority now 
became the re-harmonization of its position in the EC and strengthening the 
common approach.
By the end of May, Bosnia had been recognized both by the EU and the US 
and admitted to the UN. However, all o f these were not enough to stop Serb 
atrocities; the war was continuing with all its brutality resulting in the 
fleeing of thousands of Bosnians from their homes. The ones that remained 
home were subjeeted to one of the most brutal genocide in European 
history.'" Despite all, the world set baek and watched. The only significant 
initiative of the international eommunity came in May with the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) resolution which imposed a comprehensive trade embargo 
on Serbia and Montenegro and froze all overseas financial assets ol' 
Yugoslavia. This was the first time that the West imposed seemingly serious
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economic and military sanctions on the Serbs, believing that it would stop 
the Serb aggression/"'
When the war began in April, Bosnia was deprived because of the arms 
embargo imposed by the UN Security Council on all territories of the former 
Y ugoslavia.
‘‘Chapter VII of the UN Charter granted all member states the 
‘inherent right’ to individual and collective self-defense. This 
right was not inalienable, as many critics of international policy 
frequently argued with reference to Bosnia. It was a right subject 
to the greater authority of the UN Security Council: nothing 
could impair the right to self-defense ‘until the Security Council 
has taken an appropriate decision.’”*^
The arms embargo issue had put the international community to shame as 
the war went on. It was a contradiction within itself. It was imposed on 
former Yugoslavia and the UN, by recognizing Bosnia as a sovereign state 
in May 1992, agreed that it was a separate entity from Yugoslavia. 
However, the country was still treated as if nothing had changed and this 
encouraged the Serbs into more ethnic cleansing. Moreover, the UN 
Secretary General Boutros Ghali ruled out the use of UN forces 
(UNPROFOR) that were set up in Bosnia for the peacekeeping operation of 
Croatia. By May 16, most of the UNPROFOR situated in Sarajevo was
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withdrawn. The EU followed suit and withdrew its monitors by accepting 
that nothing could be accomplished under the existing circumstances.
It was only at the end of June that the UNPROFOR came back to Sarajevo 
airport, and even then only to control and supervise the delivery ol' 
humanitarian aid. But this duty could not be practiced properly; the 
UNPROFOR soldiers were corrosive in discipline and vulnerable to the 
permission of the Serb paramilitary in the delivery o f the aid.“
While the war was going on, German Foreign Minister Kinkel attended two 
conferences to discuss the Yugoslav issue in the summer of 1992. The first 
was the CSCE conference in Helsinki held in the first week of July in which 
he criticized the organization as being a ‘dead bird“ ’ unable to reach any 
decisions. Indeed, there was much debate in the conference, but no 
compromise. In the end of August, another conference was held in London, 
again to discuss the war in former Yugoslavia. All parties to the conflict 
were present in London; the EU foreign ministers, the members o f UNSC, 
some members of the CSCE, as well as the representati\es from all the 
former republics of Yugoslavia. The Serbs were ‘invited to behave human'. 
The Bosnian foreign minister Haris Silajdzic said that it was a shame for 
Europe of not being able to stop the war, and proposed that the international
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community should at least lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and recognize 
the right of the country to self defense. He was, naturally, skeptical the 
Serbs and stated that one should be either dumb or too naive to trust an 
aggressor that has broken the cease-fire for dozens of times would this time 
hold on to its promise and behave properly’. One other skeptic of the 
conference was the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel. He phrased the 
conference as the last chance to solve the conflict by political means. The 
biggest success of London for Kinkel was the stricter supervision of the UN 
on the imposition of the embargo on Serbia and Montenegro.;; The 
conference was the first step of UN-EU cooperation, where the co-chairmen 
of the two institutions, Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, decided to put forth a 
joint plan for a political solution in Yugoslavia. The conference was closed 
with the recognition of Bosnia’s territorial integrity and identification o f 
Serbia and Montenegro as aggressors in the conflict. It further called upon 
the introduction of UN peacekeeping forces into Bosnia in order to 
maintain a cease-fire in the area.
The Geneva Peace Conference the following month was tasked to find 
mechanisms to implement the principles laid down in London. However, 
instead of honoring the recognition of Bosnian territorial integrity of the 
London Conference, the co-chairmen David Owen and Cvrus Vance
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introduced the notion of “three warring factions”. This notion placed the 
Izzetbegovic government on the same level as with the Croat and Serb 
"insurgents', which, in turn, laid the basis for negotiating the partition of 
Bosnia. This was obviously a big reward to the Serb aggression. From there 
on, the UN and the EU mediators, along with the Western media, began to 
treat the Bosnian government as only representing the Muslims, although by 
February 1993 the Bosni^ın cabinet included six Serbs and five Croats in
addition to nine Muslims.'68
Taking Geneva as a basis, Vance and Owen began to mediate between the 
“warring factions”. This attempt soon proved to be impossible since the 
parties were unable to agree on any fundamental principle. The Bosnian 
President Izzetbegovic insisted on the territorial integrity of his state; the 
Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic and Serbian President Milosevic proclaimed 
that any area inhabited by Serbs -even if they are a minority in the area- had 
the right to join with the leirger Serbian state being created. Thus, by October 
1992. no compromise could be reached between the so-called ‘warring 
parties', and Vance and Owen decided to conclude a peace plan without 
taking into consideration the demands of the warring sides.
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By the summer of 1992, there started a debate in Germany about the 
military cooperation of the country in regard to Yugoslavia. However, any 
military activity outside the country was an issue o f a very sensitive nature. 
The issue lacked a constitutional as well as public support at home. 
Nevertheless, in August 1992 Germany began contributing to the Adriatic 
naval operations as part of NATO -  WEU joint sanctions monitoring.*’’ But 
this was probably all Germany was prepared to do.
¿Instead, the year 1992 revealed that Germany had no intention of 
formulating a policy on Bosnia independent from its partners, nor was it 
prepared to lead the EU into action. Instead, it was acting in full harmony 
with the rest of the EU member states, and especially with France. Both 
France and Germany made much effort to show a picture of one to the 
outside world, even if they were not in full agreement. This was due to their 
will to promote the political union of the EU, and Bosnia soon became just 
part of a practice for this end.™
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4.3. The Situation on the Ground in Bosnia in 1993
The year 1993 began with the peace talks in Geneva on the basis of the plan 
put forth by Vance and Owen.
"The Vance-Owen Plan in fact made a dramatic break with the 
past diplomatic practice and in one swoop annulled a key 
principle of international law that had been agreed upon in the 
interests of fostering stability in political transitions. Known as 
uti possidetis, ita possidetis (you may keep what you had 
before), the principle established that when colonial possessions 
became independent or when existing states broke up, internal 
administrative borders should be treated £is legitimate... With the 
Vance-Owen Plan, the EC began its slide away from uti 
possidetis and opened the door to partial recognition of 
conquests.””
The plan proposed to divide Bosnia into ten self-governing provinces. 
Although, on paper, there was an emphasis on the preservation of a unified 
Bosnian state, the central government was granted almost no authority to 
hold the country together. There was no distinct clause that would stop the 
Bosnian Croats and the Serbs from joining Croatia and Serbia proper. The 
plan gave about half of the Bosnian territories to the Serb control which was 
much more than the pre-war Serb population ratio, but less than the Serb 
forces held in 1993. Freedom of movement was to be assured and the UN 
troops would patrol 'corridors’ linking the separate areas to each other. The 
Croats accepted the plan on stage, since it responded to the Croat
59
aspirations. The plan offered the Muslims about thirty percent of the total 
territory, which was disproportionate to the pre-war number of the Muslim 
inhabitants of Bosnia.
fhe Bosnian President Izzetbegovic first resisted. But under persistent 
Western pressure, he grudgingly accepted it, in the hope that war would 
come to an end. The Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, rejected the plan on 
12 January 1993. They were, indeed, encouraged in their aggressiveness by 
the conditions of the plan set forth and by the lack of will of the 
international community to impose credible sanctions. As the negotiations 
were continuing, they captured eastern Bosnia (Gradacac, Gorazde, Orasje, 
lastly Srebrenica) which was proposed in the plan to be under Muslim 
control.
Meanwhile tension between the Croats and Muslims broke out in open 
warfare. The Vance-Owen Plan was the real cause for the fighting between 
the two former allies. The Croats realized that what the Plan set forth was to 
reward the territory won on the battlefield, so more victories, by any means, 
might result in more territorial gain on the ta b le .T h e  fighting changed 
direction of the alignment to such an extent that Croats began cooperating 
with the Serbs auainst the Muslims.
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The US that held distant to the conflict till then stepped in with a declaration 
of 'Six Points’. In February 1993, the US government explained its 
readiness to engage stronger in the war in Bosnia with the aim of achie\ ing 
peace on the basis of the Plan set forth. In February 1993, Washington 
hosted the foreign ministers of Britain, Russia, Spain and France and 
proposed to guarantee six ‘safe havens’ to the Bosnian Muslims. At the 
beginning of March the United States began the air-drop operation to help 
sustain enclaves in eastern Bosnia, which could not be reached by land 
convoys. By the end of March Germany began to take part in US air-drop 
operation.
By then it became clear, however, that no resolution or new initiative short 
of using effective force was likely to deter the Serbs, who continued to reject 
any terms of negotiation. Upon the continuos rejection of the Vance -  Owen 
plan by the Serbs, the American foreign minister Warren Christopher 
unveiled a Tift and strike’ plan to his European colleagues during his 
famous trip to Europe in May 1993. The US by then was convinced that the 
Serbs could only be pushed to the negotiation table through the use of force. 
The idea of Tift’ aimed to exempt the Muslims from the arms embargo and 
enable them to defend themselves on even terms. This would in turn result 
in a stalemate in the battlefield that would induce the Serbs to negotiate with
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the Muslims seriously. The other concept, the ‘strike’, referred to the threat 
of the use of air power against the Serbs, if any violation of any UN 
resolution came about.
The US made a proposal to the UN Security Council in June 1993 in order 
to lift the arms embargo in favor of the Bosnian government. However, the 
proposal could not get sufficient support from the European powers, except 
for Germany which hoped that the plan would bring a rush and clear-cut 
solution to the conflict. Germany in the issue of lifting the embargo stood 
next to the US, facing its European partners Britain and France. Britain and 
France were opposing the lift under the thesis that a lift on arms embargo 
would prolong the fighting. The European argument was that more arms 
might lead to a larger war possibly by drawing the Yugoslav army, which by 
then had become the army of Serbia proper, into the conflict, and thereby 
expand it, engulfing Serbia and then Croatia into this expanded war. Under 
these circumstances, the British and French forces on the ground in former 
Yugoslavia might be exposed to a considerable danger and might needed to 
be evacuated beforehand. This would eventually cut off any further 
deliveries of humanitarian aid. If the Western forces were not be evacuated. 
Britain and France feared that the air strikes against the Serbian targets 
might lead the Serbs to retaliate against Western forces on the ground or
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turn these forces into hostages. Thus, France and Britain brandished their 
right to veto on the issue also when the UN General Assembly has passed a 
resolution in December the same year calling for the lift o f the arms 
embargo against the Bosnian government. Eventually, the US had to put the 
plan aside for a year and a half, and capitulate to the European initiatives.’^
Instead, palliatives were put into execution. For instance, in March 1993 the 
UNSC authorized the use of force to implement the “no-fly” ban in 
Resolution 816. On 12 April the Operation Deny Flight of NATO AWACS 
began to implement this resolution. Several NATO member countries who 
sent war planes were authorized to use force in case of violation of the no- 
fly zone. In addition, by the UNSC resolution 824 ‘safe areas’ were created 
in Bosnia in April and May 1993.’^
In May 1993. UN mediator Cyrus Vance who became wary of the prospects 
following the rejection of the Vance-Owen plan was replaced by Thorvald 
Stoltenberg. Based on the new reality of the Serb -  Croat coalition, the new 
pair revised the previous plan and presented it to the warring parties on 20 
August 1993. The Owen-Stoltenberg plan offered 52 percent of the 
territories to the Bosnian Serbs, 30 percent to the Muslims, and 18 percent 
to the C roats.'' "Western mediators at first expressed “optimisin’" at the
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prospects for Bosnian government acceptance of what was, in effect, a 
Serb-Croat plan, and described its ultimate rejection as "unexpected”. ' 
They were hoping that the Bosnian government would agree on any plan put 
forth in order to stop the war. But the Muslim dominant Bosnian parliament 
of the end of September announced that they would only agree on the plan if 
the forcibly annexed territories of Bosnia were returned back to the 
Republic.
But the policy of appeasement had reached such a point at Western capitals 
that France and Germany in November 1993 began advocating lifting of the 
economic sanctions imposed on Serbia in return for Serbia conceding some 
additional territory to the ‘Muslims’ at the negotiation table.’* This initiative 
came to no avail since the Serbs were managing to consume their needs 
'efficiently’ even under the economic embargo.
The proposal was a consequence of the EU-Action plan which authorized a 
French-German initiative for the war in Yugoslavia. The two tried to 
mediate with the parties on a loose three-nation confederation which in the 
end also became a document representing the helplessness of the West, fhe 
only positive impact of the initiative was that it brought the two leading 
countries of the EU again to a more cooperative position. After the
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reunification and the Germany’s earlier recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. 
France felt the need to counter-balance German power and contain 
Germany. Throughout 1992 and 1993, France developed a reactionary 
attitude towards German proposals which brought it closer to the British 
stance. However, for its own national interests, which were based on the 
progress of the EU, Germany could not be left aside. The two countries had 
now to show political compromise for the sake of the Union.
4.4. The Debate on German Military Cooperation
As mentioned earlier, systematic level change in European political arena, 
together with the reunification of Germany had altered the foreign policy 
parameters o f Germany. The era of post-1990 made Germany a more equal 
partner of the West, as well as a more responsible one. One of the major 
responsibilities aroused by Germany’s new role in the international arena 
was related to its military cooperation. The issue of German military 
cooperation had been a sensitive one since the end of the Second World 
War. The German philosophy in respect to military interventions separated 
it clearly from its allies. During the Cold War, German participation in 
combat operations or in actual warfare was only conceivable within the 
NATO framework which was taken by Germany basically as the means to
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defend its own territory in case of a Soviet threat. The use of military force 
was also only thinkable for the defense of a NATO ally, since an attack on 
an ally would inevitably bring the war to Germany anyhow. Thus military 
force for Germany did not have a tradition of use to further its political aims. 
As the European security system altered in the beginning of the 1990s, 
Germany lacked an immediate change in its military tradition.™
The Gulf War crisis of 1990 was an indication to this absence. Germany in 
the Gulf War was obliged to provide for its allies on every count, such as 
logistic and financial support, except for sending combat forces to the 
region. The country was put under intense pressure by its allies to send 
troops but to no avail. German troops could only be deployed for defensive 
purposes to the Turkish soil, which was an ally of NATO. The issue, indeed 
was more than a philosophical relucttince. It was the juristic and public 
constrains at home that bound the hands of the Kohl government to take an 
active role in the war in the Gulf. True, Kohl did not foresee any national 
interest for Germany in sending combat troops to the region. But even if he 
had. would not have been easy to do so because the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany did prohibit and still does the state from using the 
Bundeswehr anywhere outside the NATO defense area.*®
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On the issue of use of force, the domestic parameters of German politics 
seemed to be supporting each other. The public had developed a reluctance 
on the use of force during the past four decades; the Constitution was 
permitting the use of force only in case of self-defense, thereby putting the 
expectations of the German people on a legitimate basis. However, the 
changed international community was expecting more German participation 
in the issue of military cooperation in addition to the other diplomatic 
initiatives. The West did not want to tolerate the German attitude which 
tried to further its say in every diplomatic arena except any military 
responsibility. Thus the government at first faced a dilemma between the 
domestic and the international expectations.*'
The head of government. Kohl and Kinkel, wanted to have a judicial basis 
on all their policy implementations. The article of the Basic Law prohibiting 
German use of force out of NATO and out of allied territories needed to be 
amended. The use of force was mentioned in two articles of German Basic 
Law'; one was the article 87 paragraph 1 and 2 which explicitly states that 
the use of armed forces were only possible in case of self-defense. The 
second statement on the use of armed forces was in article 24 paragraph 2 
which empowers the Federal Republic to participate in systems of collective 
securitv.
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"A majority of constitutional lawyers, supported by the 
CDU/CSU, read this as authorizing German membership of 
NATO, and as a blank cheque for participation in activities 
taken in accordance with the United Nations Charter, be it 
peace-keeping or enforcement actions under Chapter VII. The 
German government expressed no reservation on this matter 
when Germany acceded to the UN, nor did Parliament on the 
occasion of the ratification of this accession... Since the United 
Nations, under Chapter VII, acts as a system of colleetive 
security, it fits the conditions of Art.24, and participation is fully 
permitted."'*"
Therefore, the eonservatives, at first stage believed that a change in the 
constitution was unnecessary. However, there was a counter argument 
backed by the FDP wing of the government, as well as the leading 
opposition party SPD which stated that the NATO participation could not be 
included into the case of ‘collective seeurity’, but it should rather be 
included into eollective defense, and this was not mentioned in Art.24 at all. 
Initially, both sides agreed that the Constitution lacked serving the existing 
circumstances and required a change.** But as time went on debates on the 
substance of the amendment resulted in deadlock leading the conservati\cs 
to become inelined to assume a position that the Basic Law did in fact 
permit all they wanted. Upon this stance, the government by 1992, preferred 
to ignore the opposition and the fact that the argument in the Basic Law was 
unclear and acted bv its own decision.
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Indeed, the issue of military cooperation was so complex that even the 
government members could not reach a compromise in 1992. The defense 
minister Volker Ruehe was ambitious on sending the Bundesmarine as soon 
as possible to the Coast of Adriatic and back it up by the German warships 
later on if necessary.'*^ Chancellor Kohl and foreign minister Kinkel, on the 
other hand, seemed more concerned about the judicial basis o f their 
decisions. Actually Kinkel was obliged to overcome the constitutional 
obstacles in order to persuade his own party members, the FDP 
parliamentarians. He had to propose an amendment that clarified the use of 
military only within the UN and Blue Helmets context, so that it would also 
gain acceptance by the Social Democrats. A draft was written to Karlsruhe, 
the place that identified the German Constitutional Court.*^ However, 
without waiting for the ratification of the Court, in mid-July 1992, the 
government sent Bundesmariiie forces to the coast of Adriatic. The naval 
force was composed of one destroyer and three airplanes. The aim of the 
naval force was to contribute to the monitoring of the embargo imposed on 
Yugoslavia.’^''
fhis initiative of the government was enough to raise further questions on 
German military cooperation. Every one was asking and discussing to what 
extend the German eo\ernment could be authorized to lead the German
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armed forces. In late 1992, the German politicians as well as the head of 
military personnel were faced with the definition of morality. On the one 
hand, the pictures of the brutal and bloody war in Bosnia was continuing 
with the cries of children and raped women; and the international 
community looked helpless in its sanctions and attempts on the other. Every 
day the issue of military intervention to stop the war was pronounced by one 
or the other, and then again left aside, since no one in the West did in fact 
want to take the burden of this action. As in all the other European capitals, 
also in Bonn, sorrow was felt for the civilians’ pain but the use of armed 
forces, especially Bundeswehr was even regarded as more immoral than the
ongoing war. 8 7
The slightly existing consensus in the German parliament in keeping the 
Bundeswehr out of Bosnia had all disappeared in April 1993, when the 
German government decided to contribute to NATO AWACS airborne 
monitoring and control flights. In August 1990 Chancellor Kohl and the 
SPD chef Hans-Jochen Vogel agreed that the Bundeswehr would not take 
action outside the areas stated in the Basic Law. This included that 
Bundeswehr would not send soldiers outside the NATO defense area, and in 
case of cooperation within the UN. the Basic Law would be amended under 
a compromise of the political parties. Since this agreement could not be
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continued, and that the government acted on its own, the SPD used the 
opportunity to join the case before the Constitutional Court. On 8 April 
1993, the German Constitutional Court outlawed the German contribution to
the Operation Deny Flight. 88
The involvement in the NATO AWACS airborne monitoring and control 
flights was highly criticized at home for having no legitimate basis. On the 
other hand, it was regarded as a break-through in German foreign policy 
traditions based on the avoidance of war and armed forces.*’
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CHAPTER V
MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WAR IN BOSNIA 1994-1995
AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY
5.1. Continuation of the war in Bosnia in 1994 and the International
Initiatives
At the beginning of 1994, the conditions in Bosnia did not offer much 
ground for optimism. The uncertainty was continuing and negotiations were 
resulting in deadlocks. Indeed the scope of the war was described to be more 
negative than a year before with the additional Croat-Muslim fighting at its 
peak. The Croatian President Tudjman was threatening to intervene on 
behalf of the Bosnian Croat forces, since towards the end of 1993, the 
fighting seemed to turn to a Muslim upper hand against the Croats. But 
military intervention could be very expensive for Croatia, since it was 
threatened with sanctions by the West in case of intervention. On 10 January 
1994, the Croatian and Bosnian presidents met in Bonn for a compromise on 
the division of Bosnia, however, no conclusion could be reached. The
lighting continued during the talks. 90
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In regard to Serbia, President Milosevic had emerged from the December 
1993 general elections as the leading figure, but his room for maneuver \\ as 
narrowing. Mass poverty and economic collapse was almost total; the 
country was faced with hyper-inflation -a  million percent per month in the 
beginning of 1994- and the opposition against Milosevic was becoming 
more reactionary. Moreover, his influence on the Bosnian Serb leadership 
was weakening: he was not able to persuade them on territorial concessions 
as required by the West as a prelude to a comprehensive peace.
Meanwhile the UN peacekeeping forces had begun complaining about their 
helplessness; lacking military efficiency, they were being insulted and 
threatened and even taken as hostage by the Serb paramilitaries. Under these 
circumstances, the West began repeatedly to mention NATO air strikes to 
stop the Serb aggression.
'The general view was that the western Alliance was at a turning 
point: it would either withdraw the UN peacekeeping force from 
the region latest by the beginning of the following year and 
leave the warring parties to their own faith, or it would begin 
implementing the threat that it gave to the Serbian side several
times 91
However, the indecisiveness of the West continued, until the mortar attack 
of February 1994 on a market place in Sarajevo which resulted in the killing
7 3
ol'sixly-eight civilians and wounding 197 others. The horrible scenes of the 
attack caused more attention than expected in the international media and 
created the feeling that something must be done as soon as possible. This in 
return caused some mobilization in the diplomatic initiatives. The UN 
military and civilian leaders began negotiating for a cease fire for Sarajevo. 
NATO issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of 
Sarajevo. At the end of February, due to the ongoing Serb aggression and 
under pressure from the West, the Croats and the Muslims signed a 
'Framework Agreement' that established a federation within Bosnia 
between the Croats and the Muslims. At the four days of talks in 
Washington, the Croats were persuaded on territorial concessions to the 
Muslims. The Croat change of attitude and accepting concession could be 
based on Tudjman’s will to be the ‘good boy’ in the eyes of the West in 
particular o f Germany, so that the political and economic support from the 
West would continue.'^" The federation foresaw 51 percent of the Bosnian 
territories, of which 34 percent would be under Muslim and 17 percent 
under Croat control.* '^ Interestingly, Russia was involved in the negotiations 
of the West and was accused by the Serbs o f letting them down.’  ^On 10 and 
1 I April 1994, the first of the NATO air strikes was practiced on the Serb 
forces in Gorazde, which initially was designated as one of the safe areas of 
the UN.
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I rom these air strikes towards the end of April, a new diplomatic initiative, 
the Contact Group, emerged for the implementation of an overall peace 
process in Bosnia. ‘The Contact Group represented the first point in the 
international involvement in the Yugoslav conflict where the major players, 
despite their divergent perspectives and preferences, attempted to act 
decisively with an agreed political objective and as one.”'^ * It was led by the 
US in cooperation with representatives of France, Russia, UK and Germany. 
The latter's involvement was important due to its major position in the EU, 
as well as due to its potential influence over Croatia. In the summer of 1994 
the parties were offered a Federation within the 51 percent o f the Bosnian 
territories of which 34 percent would go to the Muslims and 17 percent to 
the Croats. The Serbs were left with the remaining 49 percent.
In return for accepting the Plan, the Serbs were promised the lifting of the 
economic embargo. If they would not accept the Plan, the West threatened 
to lift the arms embargo on the Muslims. The Serbs declared the Plan to be 
dissatisfactory, since the offered portion was much less than what they held 
at the time. -72 percent- even though the offer was much more than the 
proportion of the Serb population in Bosnia of 1990. The Bosnian Serb
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leader Karadzic demanded more territorial concession for the 'Lebensraum
of the Serb nation' and an opening to the Adriatic. 9 7
Upon the Serb refusal, the US restated the need to lift the arms embargo on 
Bosnia and tighten the sanctions against the Serbs. By this, however, the US 
aimed to create a balance between Serb and Muslim forces. The lift of the 
arms embargo issue was highly opposed by the Contact Group members, 
Russia, France and the UK. For London and Paris, lifting of the embargo 
should be the last thing to have in mind. The two European states further 
threatened that they would withdraw their Blue Helmets if such a decision 
was to be accepted at this point. Despite its European counterparts, Germany 
in principle was supporting the US point of view. But alone Germany's and 
US' will was not enough within the Contact Group. Nevertheless, the 
Clinton administration insisted on the lift and declared in August that it had 
put the deadline for the Serbs to the end of October. The US stated that the 
delivery of arms to Bosnia would begin in November even if the 
international community did not agree.“^*
In the meantime, starting with summer 1994, the consensus between the 
Serbian President Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic began to 
break dow n. A struggle for power had started. The Serbian President seemed
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more read>’ to accept negotiations than Karadzic. Milosevic had his own 
reasons for doing so; he was exhausted from the embargo as well as the 
financial burden caused by the war. Therefore, Karadzic’s rejection of the 
Plan of the Contact Group was not welcomed and supported by Milosevic. ’’ 
Indeed, in October 1994, the Serbian President described the war in Bosnia 
as an unnecessary adventure and called on the Bosnian Serbs to end the 
fighting. "They have reached their objective,” he said in Belgrade and that 
"further fighting would be a territorial aggression towards others.” '”“
By the end of 1994, the United States and its allies could not reach a 
compromise on the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia and, as it declared 
previously, the US in November 1994, withdrew its two war ships from the 
Adriatic which were situated for the enforcement of the arms embargo. 
According to some press reports, the US even took a further step and began 
arming the Croats and the Muslims.'”' The strongest opposition to the US 
initiative came from Britain and France. The rest of the NATO forces 
continued to practice the embargo in the Adriatic with the remaining sixteen 
ships.
"De facto little has altered in the Blockade, which de facto was no more in 
existence since the troops of the Bosnian government were already recei\ ing
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war materials by some means.” '“' The embargo in fact had ceased to exist a 
long time ago. The Serbs received weapons from the Russians for most of 
the war period. Now that the West seemed reluctant and ignorant on the 
issue, countries supporting the Croats and the Muslims had also started 
military aid. The Islamic states, ‘fed up with the West's pusillanimity and 
lack of resolve, stepped up arms aid to the Croat-Muslim alliance.’’"’
Upon these developments, beginning in Autumn 1994, the Croat-Muslim 
front started to show more strength on the battlefield. The Bosnian 
government forces had recaptured a considerable portion of territory to the 
east and southeast of Bihac by the end October. They even managed to crash 
a Serbian battalion in battle around Sarajevo. Oddly enough, at this point the 
UN troops intervened and expelled the Bosnian troops. The same day, UN 
special envoy Yasushi Akashi issued a protest to Izzetbegovic, and 
threatened the Bosnian government with serious counter-measures in the 
event of a recurrence.'"“
By December, the West’s disagreement seemed like a mass. France and 
Britain wanted to pull their troops out of Bosnia in reaction to the US 
initiative. Their withdrawal would mean the termination of the UN mission 
in Bosnia, since the French and British forces made up a third of the total
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IJNPROFOR units in the region. The US acknowledged that in case of a UN 
withdrawal from the region, the US would lead NATO into a militar\ 
intervention.'“^  The Russian foreign minister Kozyrev at this stage 
announced that Russia might preserve its military presence in the region 
even after the termination of the UNPROFOR mandate.'““ The Serbs were 
worried about the removal of the UN forces, “since UNPROFOR had been 
allowing Bosnian Serb forces to skim off nearly 50 percent of all food 
brought in for ‘humanitarian’ purposes and nearly 40 percent of all fuel.’"'" 
With the possibility of NATO intervention in Bosnia, the eyes turned on 
German military contribution within the NATO context.
5.2. Towards the Decision for German Troops Deployment on the 
Ground
German contribution was first placed on the agenda of NATO and UN 
before Nox ember 1994. But, upon the request of the German government, 
the issue was left aside by the US and U"N until the general elections of the
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Federal Republic were over. Right after the elections, pressure on Germany 
for further military aid in the war in Bosnia increased.
In fact, as early as August 1994, the German Constitutional Court in 
Karlsruhe gave acceptance to the Bundeswehr contribution within the UN 
peacekeeping forces which meant that Germany could from then on send its 
Blue Helmet soldiers around the world where the UN was serving for 
'collective security’. With this decision, Karlsruhe was at last legitimizing 
the position of German naval forces in the Adriatic. The declaration of the 
Court was received triumphantly among the cabinet members, whereas the 
public debate and the criticism of the opposition was still continuing. 
Foreign Minister Kinkel stated that the ‘brakes which hindered their actions 
were now over.’ However, the Federal government was still not happy. The 
judges of Karlsruhe had written down some prerequisites even if the clarity 
of the sentences required further interpretation:
■‘The use of German troops is only possible in case of UN 
Security Council Resolution; the use of force requires ‘pre- 
constitutive approval of the Bundestag’. The Bundeswehr is not 
'on its own as the might-potential to practice the executive, but 
is responsible to the democratic, parliamentary and judicial order 
of the state’. ‘The structure and density of the contribution’ must 
be resolved under a unique law. ‘In case of a Bundestag 
announcement, the Bundeswehr is obliged to end its
mission •I os
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I he decision of the Constitutional Court was indeed complex and exposed 
to question marks. German military contribution was allowed under a 
‘system of collective security’. Whether this statement referred only to the 
UN contribution or whether it also included the actions within the WEU and 
NATO context was vague. The opposition, SPD, argued that the decision of 
Karlsruhe foresaw only the UN initiative. The coalition government, on the 
other hand, was convinced that the law was covering all, including 
Bundeswehr contribution also within NATO.'“’
Although the historical perceptions on Germany had seemingly evaporated 
among its allies, the Federal Republic still showed high sensitivity on the 
issue. The public opinion and the opposition did not seem to be comfortable 
with the extensions of the use of Bundeswehr."“
“How much material and how many soldiers should the 
Bundeswehr make ready so that both the Allies would be 
satisfied, and the image be avoided that the Germans enter the 
War in the Balkans with ‘Hurra’?”
fhe government was at home defending the extension of the use of armed 
forces, whereas outside, towards its partners it continued to show reluctance, 
saying that the Constitutional Court did not allow and that it would not be 
proper for Germany to take front against Serbs due to its historical
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perceptions."" These justifications were all taken by the allies as Germany's 
attempts to escape from responsibility." ’
In November 1994, the US demanded German military contribution in 
Bosnia within the NATO context. The Bundeswehr Tornado was to be 
positioned in Bosnia. Moreover, German soldiers would help on the ground 
in case of UN withdrawal from the region. The Federal government found 
itself between a dilemma; on one side wanting to keep the promise given to 
the partners that after the legal obstacles Germany would act in a more 
responsible manner, on the other side faced with the fears o f the historical 
perceptions at home. In the beginning of December the German government 
declared that further German contribution to NATO was unthinkable. This 
statement softened throughout the month."'' Towards the end of the same 
month the government decided to send the German Tornados to Bosnia 
under NATO command. This shift in decision within a very short period of 
time had several reasons.'"
fhe government began to alter its announcements in the second half of 
December. Foreign Minister Kinkel and Defense Minister Ruehe began 
saying that if Germany was obliged to take responsibility to end the war. it 
should do so. Since what made credit in the domestic politics was issues of
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humanitarian concern, this issue was also represented as a case serving 
humanitarian ends, namely, the termination of the suffering of the Muslims 
in Bosnia. Moreover, taking further responsibility could have increased the 
German credit in international politics; the government argued that it might 
return to Germany in the form of more say in the UN or the Security 
Council. Thus towards the end of the month, Kohl said that they could not 
let their friends down, and declared that Germany would take part with its 
soldiers on the ground."^’ The decision received a lot of criticism from the 
major opposition party, SPD, that Germany should not contribute to 
NATO’s intention to become world police. The opposition, indeed, 
continued its critical point of view on the Atlantic Pact. On the details of the 
topic, the opposition and the government could not get to a compromise." 
It was further claimed that nothing could be improved with the additional 
German contribution to the region. Kohl was accused of being interested 
onl>' in his image in the eyes of his partners and thereby ignoring the costs 
of the action."“
fhe shift in stand in regard to military contribution was indeed a 
revolutionary one for Germany. The German government perceived the 
issue as another step for Germany becoming a normal and an equal state that 
attempts to take share in the responsibility of international conflicts next to
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its partners The government partners. Kohl and Kinkel, were convinced that 
Germany’s change of attitude was a consequence of the systemic-le\el 
change in Europe, and that it was the duty of a stronger Germany to cope 
with the changes. The Social Democrats in the opposition, however, seemed 
to be more concerned with the images that might arise due to German) s 
expansion of the use of military force. They interpreted the decisions taken 
on Bundeswehr contribution as the first signs for the revival of the history.'' ’ 
Nevertheless, it was a major step representing the transition of German 
foreign policy tradition in the post-Cold War era.
5.3. Major Developments of 1995 and German Troops on the Ground
The year 1995 started with a four month cease-fire which came about 
through the efforts of the former US president Jimmy Carter. Within these 
four months the Contact Group hoped to further the negotiations between 
the parties. The cease-fire was established between the Muslim-led 
government and the Bosnian Serbs, but the Serbs of Krajina did not get 
involved in this truce and continued their fighting in the northwest Bihac 
enclave. The Contact Group in February 1995 put together an outline 
agreement on a plan that foresaw a further easing of sanctions on Serbia in 
return for Serbian recognition of Bosnia and Croatia. The Plan proposed that
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Milosevic would cease to give military aid to the Bosnian or the Croatian 
Serbs. In case he would continue or restart military aid, sanctions would be 
reimposed on Serbia. Although being deprived heavily from the economic 
sanctions, the offer of the Contact Group was a hard deal for Milosevic. At 
the time, about 70 percent of Bosnia and close to a third of Croatia was held 
by the Serb forces. Recognition of Bosnia and Croatia would mean to deny 
this reality which he himself had created and supported.
In the beginning of March, Croatia formed a military alliance with the 
Muslim-Croat front of Bosnia which further strengthened the already 
recovered Muslim-Croat forces. The Croat-Muslim Accord was permitting 
Croatia to get officially involved in the fighting in Bosnia, particularly in 
those areas adjacent to the Croatian border such as the north-west Bihac 
territories. The support from Croatia added muscle to the anti-Serb front 
which resulted in a stronger position for the Federation both on the 
battlefield as well as on the negotiation table.
By May the war had restarted with an escalated swing in which Tudjman 
claimed to conquer back all territories occupied by the Serbs. To this aim, 
the Croat forces first of all managed to recapture Western Slavonia. 
Meanwhile Serbian attacks on Sarajevo were continuing. Karadzic
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threatened to harden its attacks by taking the Blue Helmets as hostage and 
by attacking the safe areas in case of NATO air strikes against the Serbs.'’"
Ignoring the threat of the Bosnian Serb leader, by mid-May NATO restarted 
its air strikes. After bombing an ammunition depot near the Serb 
headquarters of Pale, the Bosnian Serbs took 350 UN peacekeepers as 
hostage. France and Britain began pressing Milosevic to help release the 
hostages but to no avail. They, therefore, decided to send in rapid reaction 
forces to support the UN troops. Initially the US wanted to send in the rapid 
reaction forces under the command of NATO. Due to the opposition of the 
European partners, France and Britain, this proposal had been let aside. 
However, the US continued with its plan on NATO action. The West was 
still not acting in harmony on a strategy in Bosnia.'"'
Both sending of supplementary UN forces and the intervention of NATO 
required the cooperation of the Bundeswehr. While the allies were busy with 
getting to a compromise on the operation in Bosnia, the Germans were 
concerned at home with their own troublesome issue, the amount and form 
of the military support that the Federal government was permitted to give to 
its partners. The Germans put forth the bureaucratic obstacles and 
obligations for sending the Bundeswehr in the aim of delaying the
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unavoidable final. According to the new arrangement of the Constitutional 
Court. Kohl and his coalition partners needed to take the approval of the 
Parliament for each single cooperation o f the Bundeswehr outside the 
NATO defense area. Besides, the approval of the Parliament in case of 
contribution of the Bundeswehr within NATO but outside the NATO 
defense area (since the Constitutional amendment only foresaw a case of 
’collective security’ which intends to refer to the UN, but leave open 
NATO), should also be backed up by the Constitution in Karlsruhe.'” 
Nevertheless, the German government was ready to support a US -NA 'fO- 
initiative.'"’
However, Bonn found itself in its traditional dilemma of trying to keep in 
solidarity both with its European partners as well as with the US. The 
European partners, France and Britain, were not supporting a NATO 
intervention which would be led by the US. As the German Defense 
Minister Ruehe and Foreign Minister Kinkel were waiting ready for the 
command to deploy the Bundeswehr Tornados to Bosnia, the dispute at 
home was stilt not resolved. The German Tornado aircraft, which Brussels 
demanded from Germany, was specialized for air-defense suppression cases. 
The Secretary General of SPD, Rudolf Scharping opposed the contribution 
of German Tornados in Bosnia and claimed that the deployment of any
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German military equipment to the region would only further esealate the 
situation on the ground. The leader of the second opposition party -the 
Greens- in the Parliament, Joschka Fischer was also on the same line with 
the SPD. Fischer argued that the government was by this initiative self- 
straitening its foreign policy dimensions. Yet, Defense Minister Ruehe's 
argument that the contribution would enhance the solidarity between 
Germany and its partners took the support of 45 Social Democrats and four 
Greens in addition to the Christian Democrat and Free Democrat 
parliamentarians.'"^ Thus, by June 1995, Germany began to take part in the 
NATO air strike operation with its Tornado aircraft, equipped specifically 
for air defense suppression. “Kohl and Kinkel, step by step, were making the 
unified Germans get used to the concept of worldwide military
intervention. 125
In July, the Serbs captured the two safe areas in eastern Bosnia, Srebrenica 
and Zepa. A third safe area, Gorazde, was exposed to a Serb onslaught. The 
Croats, in the meantime, had captured Krajina and the Dalmatian coast, 
which was popular with its tourist industry. The Krajina capture became in 
return a justification for Serbs for further attacks in Bosnia, but they felt 
weaker now both mentally and materially. Materially weak, because the 
Muslim-Croat alliance had become on to equivalent terms with the Serbs.
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since the alliance did receive military aid from several countries. Mentally 
weak, because all the legends on Serbs’ invincibility had come to an end. In 
addition to this, the Bosnian Serb leaders Ratko Mladic and Radovan 
Karadzic had been indicted by the UN War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague.
The capture of the safe areas ceased the remaining patience in the 
international community, especially in regard to the US. The already 
crippled UN credibility was all destroyed.'"^ In these newly created 
circumstances, the US seemed more ready to intervene in Bosnia even if it 
did not take the support of its European partners. After all the threats and 
ultimatums issued to the Serbs, if an operation ending the war could not take 
place, the US credibility and deterrence in the international arena might well 
be annulled. Moreover, Clinton was eager to end the war before the coming 
general elections.
In response to the 28 August Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo which killed 
about 40 civilians and wounded more than eighty others, on 30 August 
NATO allies embarked on a concerted air campaign against Serb forces. The 
bombing became a decisive event in bringing the Serbs, who were already 
exhausted by Croat-Muslims groups, on to the negotiation table. While the 
bombing was going on, the US sent Richard Holbrooke as its special envoy
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to the region. Holbrooke was tasked with the coordination of the peace 
efforts and negotiating the details of a comprehensive settlement.'''^ 
Although the Russians and even some European states openly complained 
about the duration of the NATO bombing, the US continued with the 
operation and Germany remained loyal to the air strikes.
5.4. Coming to the Terms of Peace in Dayton and the German Role 
within the Contact Group
As early as September, the intense NATO bombing gave its feedback and 
the Serbs expressed their readiness to accept the peace plan proposed by the 
West. The first meeting took place on September 8"' in Geneva in the 
presence of the foreign ministers of the three countries, Serbia. Bosnia, and 
Croatia. The second meeting took place at the end of the same month, on 
September 26"' in New York. Two agreements came out from the two 
meetings. According to these two accords, a single Bosnian state was to be 
established that would consist of two entities, the Serbian Republic and the 
Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia. Territorial proposal was left for 
adjustment by mutual agreement. Both entities had the right to establish 
special relationships with the neighbors, consistent with the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Bosnia. In regard to the initial Croat and Serb
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republics, Croatian-Bosnian relations were not put under limitation unless it 
Jeopardized Bosnia’s border, whereas the Serbs could have only a special 
link to Serbia.'“’^ There was an undeniable US diplomatic initiative in 
coming to the terms of peace in Bosnia. Initially, it was the NATO bombing 
and the shuttle diplomacy of Holbrooke that changed the scope of the 
events. Another consequence of Richard Holbrooke’s diplomacy was the lift 
of the siege on Sarajevo by October in return for a recommendation to 
NATO to suspend the bombing.
In November the final peace talks began in Dayton, Ohio. The Dayton 
Accord was concluded on 21 November. The main points of the plan were 
as follows: NATO troops were going to supervise the separation o f forces; 
Bosnia would be an internationally recognized state within its present 
borders; the state would be composed of two entities -the Bosnian Serb 
Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation-; human rights were to be 
monitored by an independent commission; free elections were to take place 
under international supervision; the central government would include a 
parliament, presidency, and a constitutional court; people indicted for war 
crimes were to be excluded from political life; refugees would be allowed to 
return to their homes or seek equitable compensation; Sarajevo, the capital, 
would remain united under the Muslim-Croat Federation.'’“
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Although fighting was stopped, everybody had its complains about the 
Dayton Accords. Balkan leaders expressed their dissatisfaction even during 
the process, but the US left no other choice for them. The European leaders 
of the Contact Group complained that they were kept abreast of the 
developments and stated that the Dayton Accords were not much different 
from the plan they had put forth the year before. Initially, it was true that the 
plan was not much different from the other ones. What caused the 
breakthrough was the decisive operation of the US and the diplomatic 
approach of Holbrooke.
The diplomatic passiveness of Germany during the Dayton negotiations was 
the same as its European partners. While during the developments leading to 
Dayton Germany attempted to give support to the US with the aim of 
stopping the ongoing war, during the Dayton process it took a protectionist 
attitude towards its European partners. Apparently, the Germans did not 
want the EU to be undermined in international politics.'^' In respect to the 
Dayton Accords, NATO troops were to be deployed in Bosnia. Although 
still being debated at home, the issue lost its attraction; but the public 
seemed to have got used to German military cooperation.'^"
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
During much of the Cold-War period Germany or as it was officially known. 
Federal Republic of Gennany, was under heavy political restrictions because 
of its war guilt in the Second World War. Its foreign policy-fonnulation 
process was always under scrutiny by the victorious Allied Powers. It 
regained some freedom in the 1960s and especially 1970s in terms of foreign 
policy-making, nevertheless, its decision-making was still heavily influenced 
by its relations with the West in general, and with the US in particular. All 
these constraints imposed upon Bonn following the World War II led to the 
development of a new political culture in Germany that enjoined a passive 
international attitude. That, in turn, shaped the way new generations' approach 
to world affairs.
All this was certainly in line with the way the Allies after the War looked at 
Germany: the country should be allowed to develop, and the West should 
encourage and even help German development. But it ought not to be allowed 
to regain its fomier role at the heart of Europe and threaten European peace as 
it did prior to the Second World War. Germany, which was by no means able 
to rel'use this new state of affairs on the European continent, flourished 
economically and became an economic super power within a few decades 
following the World War II. Towards the end of the Cold War period, it w as
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the leading economic power within the EC/EU which was originally set up in 
the early 1950s to contain Germany.
By the time all the communist regimes began to fall one after the other in the 
former Eastern European countries, Germany looked well-disposed to play an 
important role in Eastern Europe with its huge economic resources. Indeed, 
from late 1960s onwards Germany had established economic relations with 
these countries. The fall of the Berlin Wall which had symbolized for decades 
the division of larger Germany after the Second World War brought about the 
unification of these two German states, an event which had world-wide 
repercussions. This obviously stirred up enormous euphoria throughout 
Germany: it was the end of communism, as well as the division of a nation. It 
was also a triumph of democracy and free market economy over a totalitarian 
system and a state-run economy.
Although a historic event and very important for Germany, it was not 
problem-free. It imposed a huge economic burden over Germany. More 
importantly, it gave rise to suspicions in Western Europe about the directions 
Gennany would go; Some speculated, unified Germany would dominate the 
EC and dictate its foreign policy wishes, at least, in the region around itself 
though the Germans were by no means prepared for a new wave of power
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politics: the political culture flourished for four decades after the war excluded 
the idea of power politics. Instead it focused on economic development and 
the creation of a Europe which would absorb Germany, not the other wa\  ^
around.
When the Yugoslav dissolution erupted into violence in the summer of 1991 
with the Serbianised-Yugoslav army tanks attacking the break-away republic 
of Slovenia. Gennany, like the West in general, sat back and watched. It was 
still overwhelmed by the unification, the financial burden of which had b\ 
then begun to hit the Germany society throughout. In addition, it was heavily- 
involved in the transition process of the EC that was making preparations to 
turn itself into a political union. This meant that Bonn, like all the other 
Western capitals, looked initially to Washington for advice on the Yugoslav 
crisis. This sort of attitude had, in fact, been the established policy line in 
Bonn. During the Cold-War, Germany's strong military traditions had been 
clipped away. As a result, Bonn governments had become accustomed to 
simply adopting themselves to the American policy-making instead of trying 
to come up with clear-cut independent policy suggestions.
Again, it was Washington that was to lead the Western world, fhe American 
•Secretary of State, James Baker, had visited Belgrade soon before the
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Yugoslav flare-up in early June 1991. He and his colleagues in Washington 
considered Yugoslavia's preservation an important goal of the US. For one 
thing, Yugoslavia's dissolution would set a bad precedent for the Soviet Union 
which the US and Western Europe were endeavoring to hold together with 
Gorbachev at its head. Otherwise, a bloody dissolution of the Soviet Union 
might lead to unpredictable and undesirable consequences for European 
security. Indeed, there were already secessionist movements throughout the 
Soviet Union. For another, any chaos of an ethnic nature which would ensue 
the break-up of Yugoslavia might pin the European countries against each 
other and disrupt the EC/EU process. There were many in the Western world 
at the time who predicted the pandora's box if Yugoslavia was broken up into 
pieces.
Germany simply adhered to this American line which was soon embraced by 
all the Western countries although the German public in general was now 
lirmly in favour of the right to self-determination for nations following the 
unification. It soon became difficult for Germany to stick to this line of policy: 
it was directly affected by the effects of what was happening in former 
Yugoslavia. Hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming out of former 
YLigoslav tenitories as s result of ethnic cleansing campaign conducted b\ 
Serb forces in Croatia and in Bosnia ended up in Germany. Horrifying
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pictures of this ethnic cleansing filled the screens every day, creating a clamor 
in the country as in the whole world for action to stop it. German public 
became disgusted at the destruction of all those holiday resorts they had 
frequented in the past.
In addition, for the first time in recent German political history, two major 
parties began talking similarly on a foreign policy issue. The Cluistian 
Democrats, CDU, who were the leading coalition party, and their 
constituencies clamored for action, as well as the main opposition, SPD. 
Indeed, the public was so distressed by the continuous television coverage of 
the Croatian war, it was almost impossible for these two major parties not to 
respond to the public expectations. This meant that the Free Democratic Party, 
FDP, which was, and still is, the junior partner in the cabinet, felt the need to 
also respond to the public pressure: it owed its existence to the rivalry between 
the CDU and the SPD. The Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich-Genscher, leader 
of the I'DP thought that he should be more in line with public pressure than 
the other two parties.
fhe first consequence of these internal politics was that the German 
government began to press its partners in the EC/EU for the recognition of the 
break-away republics. I'here was more to that than the German internal
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politics. Meanwhile, one of the main hurdles in the way of accepting the 
Yugoslav disintegration had been overcome. Following the unsuccessful 
August coup against Gorbachev in Moscow, the Soviet Union began to fall 
apart, and towards December 1991, no-one believed in the West that the 
Soviet would survive into the year of 1992. Indeed, in the course of the first 
two weeks, the Kremlin leaders had agreed to the division of the Soviet 
Union. Moreover, the negotiations which the EC countries had been involved 
in Maastrich with a view to turning the EC into a political union had been 
concluded at the beginning of December. This relieved the EC countries in 
general, and Gemiany, in particular. The Bonn government thought that all 
Europe and the US should take these new realities into account by considering 
the recognition of break-away republics.
However Germany's European partners preferred to use the case as an 
opportunity for trade off during the Maastricht negotiations for the future of 
the EC. Britain, which had been pressing for the insertion of an opt-out clause 
on foreign and defence policies in the Maastricht treaty, used it as a trade-off 
as against the Gemían demand for recognition of break-away republics of 
Ibmier Yugoslavia. In the end Gemiany did convince its partners for 
recognition, but the international impact of the issue was not very pleasant for 
the Bonn govemnient. Starting with 1992 Germany was made the scape goat
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i'or the endless war and was accused for blowing up a country. The Western 
press, in particular, claimed that the imperial threat for Europe had come back.
All this was to make Germany extremely timid. In the Bosnia war which 
erupted at the end of March and lasted longer than three years with more 
excesses than the previous Yugoslav wars, began to pull back step by step. It 
let its European partners take the upper hand in the political decisions of the 
EU regarding Yugoslavia. The Bonn governments had to keep a low profile 
although Germany was more directly affected by the effects of the war in 
Bosnia - within a very short time after the start of the war in Bosnia hundreds 
of thousands of refugees that fled the war came up to the Bavarian border.
The only GenriEin diplomatic activity during a good part of the Bosnia war 
was the support the Bonn government gave to the United States. Each time the 
US administration proposed something which savoured of military 
intervention in order to stop the atrocities and force the Serbs to the 
negotiating table, Gemiany was prepared to support the US either tacith oi' 
openly. What Germany was most concerned with during this period under 
review was the EU solidarity. Bosnia war. all the atrocities and the genocidal 
w/ar to which Geiman public remained very sensitive had to be weighed 
against the importance of the EU. The general view in the EU was that for the
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first time since the 19th century the Europeans were able to keep united 
despite a long-running war in the Balkans. It seems that Germany had to also 
draw consolation from this view. Therefore, though Germany showed signs of 
willingness to support the US in the way of military intervention, it had to do 
it very carefully without giving rise to suspicions that unified Germany was 
out to further its own selfish, imperialistic interests rather thcin to stick to the 
EU solidarity.
fhere also limitations to what Germany could do in support of US actions. 
True, Gemían public clamored for action to stop the genocidal war, but it was 
also vary cautious about the use of German military even under NATO or UN 
umbrella. The powerful German constitutional court and its interpretation of 
whether or not the Govenunent could order German units to participate in any 
operation in Bosnia remained a nightmare for German policy-makers for a 
considerable time. In the end Geiman government overcame this 
constitutional hurdle, but the Bonn government was still careful in its military 
participation; no combat troops were ordered into Bosnia. Instead, Germany's 
participation was mostly logistical for the Allied forces.
It appears that much of the speculation about Germany's strong aims' in the 
Balkans which became prevalent in Western Europe's press as well as in
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Turkey are not borne out by a study of German foreign policy during the first 
half of the 1990s. Germany's concern about the Balkans seems to be based 
more on the issues, such as refugees and so forth, rather than strategical 
interests. It seems that Germany economic and strategic focus has been finnly 
in Eastern Europe and European Russia.
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